


Annual Risk Analysis 2013





Annual Risk Analysis 2013



Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.

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
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List of abbreviations used

AMF	Asylum and Migration Fund
ARA	Annual Risk Analysis
BCP	border-crossing point
CeCLAD-M	Centre de Coordination pour la Lutte Anti-Drogue en Méditerranée
CIRAM	Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model
CIREFI	Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration
DG	Directorate-General
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EBF	European Borders Fund
EC	European Commission
EDF-ARA	European Union Document-Fraud Annual Risk Analysis
EDF-RAN	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EES	Entry-Exit System
EFCA	European Fisheries Control Agency
EMCDDA	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EMN	European Migration Network
EPN	European Patrol Network
EU	European Union
EU-LISA	European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice
EUR	euro
EURODAC	European Dactyloscopy
EUROSUR	European border surveillance system
FRAN	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
fYROM	former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
IBM	integrated border management
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISF	Internal Security Fund
JO	Joint Operation
JORA	Frontex Joint Operations Reporting Application
MFF	Multi-annual Financial Framework
MS	Member State
NCC	National Coordination Centre
NOK	Norwegian krone
OCG	organised crime group
PNR	Passenger Name Record
PVLMM	Post Visa-Liberalisation Monitoring Mechanism
OCRIST	Office Central de Répression de l'Immigration Irrégulière et de l'Emploi d'Etrangers sans Titre
RAU	Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
RTP	registered traveller programme
SAC	Schengen Associated Country
SIS	Schengen Information System
THB	trafficking in human beings
UK	United Kingdom
UKBA	United Kingdom Border Agency
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USA	United States of America
VIN	vehicle identification number
VIS	Visa Information System



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Executive summary

Detections of illegal border-crossing along the EU's external borders dropped sharply in 2012 to about 73 000, i.e. half the number reported in 2011. This was the first time since systematic data collection began in 2008 that annual detections have plunged under 100 000.

In the Central Mediterranean area, the large number of detections in 2011, which suddenly increased following the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Libya, had been significantly reduced by the end of 2011. However, throughout 2012, detections steadily increased and by the end of the year they totalled more than 10 300.

Starting from 2008, considerable numbers of migrants had been detected crossing illegally the border between Turkey and Greece, along the so-called Eastern Mediterranean route. The situation changed dramatically in August 2012 when the Greek authorities mobilised unprecedented resources at their land border with Turkey, including the deployment of 1 800 additional Greek police officers. The number of detected illegal border-crossings rapidly dropped from about 2 000 in the first week of August to below 10 per week in October 2012.

The enhanced controls along the Greek-Turkish land border led to a moderate increase in detections of illegal border-crossing in the Aegean Sea and at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey, but simultaneous mitiga-

tion efforts in Turkey and Bulgaria have so far contained the displacements. There remains the risk of resurgence of irregular migration, since many migrants may be waiting for the conclusion of the Greek operations before they continue their journey towards Europe.

Many migrants who cross the border illegally to Greece move on to other Member States, mostly through the land route across the Western Balkans. Contrary to the decrease at the Greek-Turkish land border, there was no decrease in detections of illegal border-crossing on the Western Balkan route (6 390, +37%).

In 2012, in the Western Mediterranean area between North Africa and Spain, detections of illegal border-crossing decreased by nearly a quarter compared to 2011 but remained above the levels recorded in previous years (6 400, -24%).

In 2012, Afghans remained the most detected nationality for illegal border-crossing at EU level, but their number considerably dropped compared to 2011. Syrians stand out, with large increases in detections of illegal border-crossing and for using fraudulent documents compared to 2011. Most of the detected Syrians applied for asylum in the EU, fleeing the civil war in their country.

There were large increases in refusals of entry at the Polish land border with Belarus and



Ukraine. However, these increases were offset by a decrease in refusals of entry issued at other border sections, resulting in a stable total at EU level compared to 2011 (-3%, 115 000 refusals of entry).

Detections of illegal stayers, which totalled about 350 000 in the EU in 2012, have shown a stable but slightly declining long-term trend since 2008. Most migrants detected illegally staying in the EU were from Afghanistan and Morocco.

Despite a short-term increase of 10% between 2011 and 2012, the overall trend of detections of facilitators of irregular migration has been falling since 2008, totalling about 7 700 in 2012. This long-term decline may be in part due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels (such as overstaying, abuse of visa-free regime, etc.) and document fraud, which results in facilitators being able to operate remotely and inconspicuously.

In 2012, there were around 8 000 detections of migrants using fraudulent documents to enter the EU or Schengen area illegally.

Preliminary data on asylum applications in 2012 indicate an overall increase of about 7% compared to the previous year. While Afghans continue to account for the largest share of applications, much of the increase was due to an increasing number of applications submitted by Syrian nationals.

The number of asylum applications submitted in the EU by Western Balkan citizens, mostly those from Serbia, remained unabated in 2012. Consequently, following the implementation of the visa facilitation agreement with five Western Balkan countries that started at the end of 2009, there are now discussions in the EU about the possible reintroduction of the visa regime.

In 2012, there was a steady trend of about 160 000 third-country nationals effectively returned to third countries. Greece reported the largest number of returns of a single nationality (Albanians), and effective returns in Greece increased markedly in the last quarter of 2012 following the launch of the Xenios Zeus operation.

Looking ahead, the assessment of risks along the EU's external borders shows that despite a sharp reduction in detections between 2011 and 2012, the risks associated with illegal border-crossing along the land and sea external borders remain among the highest, in particular in the southern section of the border of the EU.

The risk of illegal border-crossing along the land borders of the Eastern Mediterranean route, including the Greek and Bulgarian land border with Turkey, is assessed amongst the highest. This comes after several years of large numbers of migrants detected at the Greek land border with Turkey. Although the flow abruptly stopped in August 2012, there are reports of uncertainties related to the sustainability of the efforts and growing evidence that migrants are waiting in Turkey for the end of the operation. Increases at the neighbouring sea border (Aegean Sea), at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey and increases in detections of document fraud from Istanbul airports, although so far relatively small, indicate that alternatives to the Greek land border are being explored by facilitators.

Many of the migrants who crossed illegally through the Eastern Mediterranean route are expected to continue making secondary movements across the Western Balkans and within the EU.

The risk of illegal border-crossing across the Central Mediterranean area was also assessed amongst the highest due the continued volatile situation in countries of departure in

North Africa. Crisis situations are still likely to arise at the southern border with thousands of people trying to cross the border illegally in the span of several weeks or months. Past experiences also show that these crises take their toll on human lives, and are very difficult to predict and quell without a coordinated response.

Most risks associated with document fraud were assessed as high. Indeed, document fraudsters not only undermine border security but also the internal security of the EU. These risks are also common to nearly all Member States, as they are associated with passenger flows and border checks, which are a specific expertise of border-control authorities.

Fraud is expected mostly among EU travel documents (e.g. passports, visas and ID cards).

False pretence or deception is used to obtain a wide range of documents. The most common technique is to use fraudulent documents to obtain short-term visas.

Most risks associated with the abuse of legal channels are assessed as high as they are common and widely spread phenomena.

Based on currently available information, the risks associated with cross-border criminality are assessed as moderate, including the risks of trafficking in human beings, terrorism, smuggling of illicit drugs and exit of stolen vehicles.



1. Introduction

The Annual Risk Analysis 2013 is intended to facilitate and contribute to informed decisions on investments and concerted actions that are most likely to have sustainable effects on the management of the external borders and ultimately on the internal security of the EU. The ARA conclusions and identified risks at the EU's external borders are meant to help effectively balance and prioritise the allocation of resources.

Frontex operational activities aim to strengthen border security by ensuring the coordination of Member States' actions in the implementation of Community measures relating to the management of the external borders. The coordination of operational activities also contributes to better allocation of Member States' resources and protection of the area of freedom, security and justice.

The ARA 2013 concentrates on the current scope of Frontex operational activities, which

focus on irregular migration at the external borders of the EU and the Schengen Associated Countries. Central to the concept of integrated border management (IBM), border management should also cover security threats present at the external borders. Hence, a full section is devoted to the phenomenon of trafficking in human beings (THB), the combating of which was tasked to Frontex pursuant to the EU action plan (2005/C 311/01) on best practices, standards and procedures for combating and preventing THB.

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) would like to express its gratitude to all members of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) in Member States for their efforts in providing data and information, as well as Europol, EASO and the European Commission, which have contributed to the ARA 2013, and all Frontex colleagues involved in the preparation of this report.



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2. Methodology

2.1. Data exchange

A coherent and full analysis of the risks affecting security at the external borders requires, above all, the adoption of common indicators. Consistent monitoring of these indicators will then allow effective measures to be taken on the ground. The analysis will need to identify the risks that arise at the external borders themselves and those that arise in third countries.

The backbone of the ARA 2013 is the monthly statistics exchanged between Member States within the framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN). This regular data-exchange exercise was launched in September 2007 and then refined in 2008. Thanks to the FRAN members' efforts, a much larger statistical coverage was achieved in 2011, focusing on seven key indicators of irregular migration: (1) detections of illegal border-crossing, (2) refusals of entry, (3) detections of illegal stay, (4) asylum applications, (5) detections of facilitators, (6) detections of forged documents and (7) return decisions and effective returns.

Following the closing of the CIREFI working group in April 2010, most of its mandate, in particular those concerning the exchange of data, were transferred to the FRAN. Most indicators monitored by CIREFI had already been part of the monthly data exchange among FRAN members and only the statistics on returns had to be added as the seventh indicator of the regular data exchange as of January 2011.

In 2011, the original FRAN indicator on forged documents was updated to enable the analysis of complex *modi operandi*. Following a successful pilot study, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN) was formed in early 2012 to oversee the exchange of a much more comprehensive and detailed indicator on document fraud, including the abuse of genuine documents.

Member States were not requested to answer specific questions in support of this analysis. Rather, bi-monthly analytical reports and incident reports of Member States routinely collected within the FRAN and Member States' contributions to several Tailored Risk Analyses produced in 2012 were both important sources of information, especially as regards the analysis of routes and *modi operandi*.

Open-source information was also effectively exploited, especially in identifying the main push and pull factors for irregular migration to the EU. Among others, these sources included reports issued by government agencies, international and non-governmental organisations, as well as official EU reports, such as the European Commission's reports on third countries, and mainstream news agencies.

The data exchanged within the FRAN are compiled and analysed on a quarterly basis. Priority is given to the use of the data for management purposes and to its fast sharing



among Member State border-control authorities. Member States' data that are processed by Frontex are not treated as official statistics, and thus may occasionally vary from the data officially published by national authorities.

Throughout 2012, some FRAN Members performed backdated updates of their 2011 statistics. These updates have been accounted for in this document and so some data presented here may differ from the data presented a year ago in the 2012 Annual Risk Analysis.

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between the Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the UK, Ireland), so that a total for Member States and the Schengen Associated Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals per airport.

In turn, Europol contributed to the ARA 2013 by providing information on facilitated irregular migration. EASO also contributed to the section on asylum applications.

2.2. Quality of available data

Consistent with other law-enforcement indicators, variation in administrative data related to border control depends on several factors. In this case, the number of detections

of illegal border-crossing and refusals of entry are both functions of the amount of effort spent detecting migrants and the actual flow of irregular migrants to the EU. For example, increased detections of illegal border-crossing might be due to a real increase in the flow of irregular migrants, or may in fact be an outcome of more resources made available to detect migrants. In exceptional cases, increased resources may produce a rise in reported detections while effectively masking the actual decrease in the flow of migrants, resulting from a strong deterrent effect.

Conservative estimates of the number of irregular migrants within the EU vary between three and six million, according to the results of *Clandestino*, an EU-sponsored project implemented by the ICMPD. Other estimates put the figure of irregular migrants at eight million, of which 80% are staying inside the Schengen area, half of them having originally entered it legally. However, there is currently no estimate of the annual flow of irregular migrants crossing the border illegally.

Information on national-level resources for border-control authorities and their allocation is currently only partially known. These data are provided by Member States themselves either within the Schengen evaluation mechanism or within the External Borders Fund reporting. Without systematic and reliable information on resources allocated to border control and without estimates of irregular migration flows, it is not possible to assess the performance and impact of the border controls put in place, and the analyses of the situation at the EU's external borders are limited to descriptive statistics of the administrative data provided by Member States.

As highlighted in the Schengen Catalogue, variation in regular passenger flow is an important factor to be taken into account in the allocation of border-control resources. How-

ever, regular flows of passengers across the EU's external borders are currently not recorded systematically.

Data on the number of EU visas issued and their places of issue would improve the characterisation of third-country passenger flows. However, this information, which is collected within the Council Visa Working Party and published by the European Commission, is not yet available for 2012. For the purpose of the ARA, data from 2008 to 2011 are discussed as an introduction to the general situation at the borders.

2.3. Application of the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)

A key development in the CIRAM 2.0 update released in 2011 was the adoption of a management approach to risk analysis that defines risk as a function of the threat, vul-

nerability and impact. Such an approach endeavours to reflect the spirit of the Schengen Borders Code and the Frontex Regulation, both of which emphasise risk analysis as a key tool in ensuring the optimal allocation of resources within constraints of budget, staff and efficiency of equipment.

According to the model, a 'threat' is a force or pressure acting upon the external borders that is characterised by both its magnitude and likelihood; 'vulnerability' is defined as the capacity of a system to mitigate the threat and 'impact' is determined as the potential consequences of the threat. In this way, the structured and systematic breakdown of risk presented as conclusion provides for an assessment of the relative overall risks posed by different threats as a function of the relevant vulnerabilities and impact, and therefore will be of much use to decision-makers in setting priorities, in formulating counter-measures and designating operational targets.



Table 1. Annual overview of situation at the border

FRAN indicator	2009	2010	2011	2012	% change on prev. year
Illegal entries between BCPs	104 599	104 060	141 051	72 437	-49
Clandestine entries at BCPs	296	242	282	605	115
Facilitators	9 171	8 629	6 957	7 720	11
Illegal stay	412 125	353 077	350 948	344 928	-1.7
Refusals of entry ¹	113 029	108 651	118 111	115 305	-2.4
Applications for asylum ²	219 814	203 880	254 054	272 208	7.1
Persons using fraudulent documents	:	:	5 288	7 888	49
Return decisions issued ³	:	:	231 385	269 949	17
Effective returns	:	:	149 045	159 490	7.0
Other indicators	11 203 043	10 241 000	11 842 761	13 510 250	14

Issued visas
(source: European Commission)

Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

¹ EDF-RAN data as of 12 February 2013

² For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For the Netherlands, inland asylum applications in Q3 and Q4 2012 are not available at this moment.

³ Data on decisions are not available for France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden.



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3. Situational picture in 2012

3.1. Passenger flow across the EU's external borders

Passenger flow is an indicator of the volume of checks that border guards have to perform, relative to the number of border guards. Citizens enjoying free movement are subject to minimum checks, while third-country nationals, whether they require visas or not, are subject to more thorough checks, as defined by the Schengen Borders Code. Hence, the nature and extent of passenger flow determine to a large extent the planning and allocation of resources for border checks.

Passenger flow data also prove useful in analysing indicators of irregular migration, in particular refusals of entry and detections of document fraud. Indeed, differences in the rates of refusal of entry over passenger flow may help identify best practice and eventually ensure that checks are performed in a harmonised way across the BCPs of the EU. Similarly, detections of document fraud are most effectively analysed in connection with passenger flows and detection rates, rather than the number of detections, and provide the most useful tool for assessing border checks and flows of document fraudsters.

At European level there is no systematic reporting on passenger flows by BCP, border section or as a total for the EU's external border. Member States reported data on passenger flow in the framework of the European

Borders Fund (EBF), but this excludes the UK and Ireland, which do not participate in the EBF, and including crossings between non-Schengen and Schengen Member States (France-UK, Belgium-UK, Romania-Hungary). The total at the air border represents all passenger flows, including passengers from EU countries. The EBF total for sea border crossing probably also includes crossings between Member States. Given these uncertainties, it is difficult to estimate the EU total passenger flow from third countries that could usefully be analysed against the number of refusals of entry and detections of fraudulent documents.

Air borders

Eurostat provides data on air passenger flow (EU nationals and third-country nationals) coming only from third countries, which totalled 125 million in 2011, including the UK and Ireland. At the air borders, estimates derived from Eurostat data released in January 2013, show a steady trend of +1% in arrivals from third countries between 2010 and 2011, at a total of about 125 million arrivals from outside the EU in 2011. The UK, Germany and France ranked amongst the first, with more than 20 million arrivals from third countries. Italy and the Netherlands follow at a distance with less than 10 million arrivals from third countries.

The largest numbers of arrivals are reported from the airport of London Heathrow with



approximately 17 million passengers, followed by Paris-Charles De Gaulle airport (13 million) and Frankfurt airport (11 million). At Frankfurt airport, as at many airports in the EU, the top priority is now on reducing the time for check-in, security and passport control.

Land borders

At the external land borders of the EU, although there is no systematic collection of passenger flow data at EU level, the busiest border section for entries of passengers is probably the border between Slovenia and Croatia, with approximately 23 million annual entries. The land border between Spain and Morocco is also a very busy border section, totalling more than 10 million annual entries (for both Ceuta and Melilla). The land border between Poland and Ukraine, with approximately seven million passengers annually, also belongs to the busiest land border sections.

Along the eastern land border, stretching for more than 4 000 km from Romania to Finland, one recurring pattern is the strong seasonality of regular passenger flows, with most of the crossings (entry/exit) taking place during the summer months. This requires an optimal mobilisation of resources during this period to avoid undue waiting time for bona fide travellers.

Passenger flows are widely expected to increase at the land borders in the coming years, in particular along the main BCPs at the land borders with the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Turkey. While all BCPs are equipped to meet the standards required by the Schengen Borders Code, differences in the nature of the flow of passengers and commercial traffic explains the differences in staffing levels between BCPs. A study* performed by the Center for the Study of Democracy, based on Member States answers for 2009, shows that there can be important differences in the characteristics of BCPs.

3.2. Visa

Visa policy acts as a form of pre-entry procedure to ensure that third-country nationals comply with entry requirements, which helps to prevent irregular migration. In this respect, particularly important in preventing subsequent illegal staying is the role of consular offices in third countries determining whether a third-country national should be granted a visa or not. Member States have introduced a variety of specific measures in their visa-issuing procedures to tackle irregular migration, which includes the assessment of willingness to return, the training of personnel at embassies and consulates, and cooperation and information exchange with other entities and Member States. Other preventive measures include the use of biometric data in the visa application process, as well as the identification of specific categories of migrants who might misuse their visa and awareness raising in third countries of the consequences of making fraudulent applications.**

The Community Code on Visas, which entered into force in April 2010, sets out the common requirements for issuing transit and short-term visas to enter the territory of Member States. There are currently over 100 nationalities that require a visa to enter the EU, covering more than 80% of non-EU population of the world. Nevertheless, about one billion nationals from approximately 40 third countries do not require an EU visa. These include Australia, Canada, Croatia, Japan, New Zealand and the USA. The list of countries whose nationals require a visa to travel to the UK or Ireland differs slightly from other EU countries. As indicated in the Visa Code, statistical data are an important means of monitoring migratory movements and can serve as an efficient management tool.

** European Migration Network Inform, *Visa policy as Migration Channels*, December 2012

* Center for the Study of Democracy, *Better Management of EU borders through Cooperation*, 2011





Figure 1. **There is no systematic reporting of passenger flow across the EU's external borders, but partial information provided by Member States shows the possible border-crossing points (BCPs) with the largest flows of passengers through the external borders**

Recent changes to Schengen regulations have seen a simplification of the visa regime. Schengen Member States now issue only three types of visa: (1) airport transit visa (A) – valid only for airport transit, does not entitle the holder to leave the transit zone of the airport; (2) short-stay visa (C); (3) national long-stay visas (D) and residence permits. Generally, a short-stay visa issued by one of the Schengen States (visa C) entitles its holder to travel

throughout the 26 Schengen States for up to three months within a six-month period. Visas for visits exceeding that period remain subject to national procedures. The data include visas issued by the Schengen Associated Countries (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland), as well as by Romania and Bulgaria, which have not yet joined the Schengen area, and exclude visa data in the UK and Ireland, which are not part of the Schengen area.



Visa requirement to enter the EU



Sources: Frontex

Figure 2. Over 100 nationalities require a visa to enter the EU, covering more than 80% of non-EU population of the world

Data for 2012 are not yet available, but the European Commission, through its DG Home Affairs has released the data for 2011. VIS data are collected on the basis of the place where the application is made, and not on the citizenship of the visa applicant. Thus, for instance, applications made in the Russian Federation do not necessarily concern only Russian nationals. However, in the following overview, the country where the visas were delivered was used as the most suitable approximation of the visas issued to citizens of that country. Visas broken down by nationalities are available at the national level, where they can be used for operational purposes.

In 2011 more than 13.8 million visas (all types) were issued by Schengen and non-Schengen Member States (including Bulgaria and Romania, but excluding the UK and Ireland). The vast majority of visas issued were category C, or short-stay visas, accounting for 98% of all visas issued, followed by long-stay visas (2%) and airport transit (A) visas (0.1%).

The annual increase of 4% between 2010 and 2011 increased the number of visas to a level similar to that of 2007, i.e. before the economic crisis hit the EU and significantly reduced the number of visitors.

Table 2. **The vast majority of visas issued are short-stay visas, accounting for more than 90% of all visas issued**

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	% of total	% change on prev. year
Airport transit visas (A)	79 140	41 998	29 107	14 591	11 456	0.1%	-21%
Short-stay visas (C)	11 921 256	11 203 043	10 241 000	11 842 761	13 510 250	98%	14%
National long-stay visas (B)	1 311 963	1 516 101	1 516 096	1 483 019	322 034	2.3%	-78%
Total	13 312 359	12 761 142	11 786 203	13 340 371	13 843 740	100%	3.8%

Source: European Commission

Consistent with every year since 2007, in 2011 the Russian Federation was where most short-term visas were issued (5 556 941) representing a 24% increase compared to the previous year. Visas issued in the top three countries account for 58% of all short-stay visas issued in 2011. Figure 3 illustrates the number of visas issued in 2010 and 2011 for the top five third countries in 2011 (circle size) and the degree of change (slopes) between the years.


This significant increase in the number of visas issued in the Russian Federation is similar to the increase of 28% observed between 2009 and 2010. In total, short-term visas issued in the Russian Federation accounted for 41% of all category C visas issued by Member States in 2011. Ukraine followed with 1 270 157 visas issued in 2011 marking an increase of 20% compared to 2010. As in 2010, China, ranked third with 1 031 866, saw the most significant increase in the number of visas issued from 2010 to 2011, i.e. by 31% and so it is shown at the top of Figure 3.

Most short-term visas were issued by France (1 938 556 visas issued, or 14% of all short-term visas issued), followed by a group of four Member States (Germany, Italy, Spain and Finland) that all issued more than 1 million visas. Together, these five Member States accounted for 56% of all issued short-stay visas.

Table 3 (overleaf) shows the numbers of visas issued by the top ten Member States in

specific third countries. This table clearly illustrates the large increase in the number of visas issued in the Russian Federation by several Member States. Spain reported the largest increase (+52%), and in most Member States, the number of visas delivered in the Russian Federation represented a double digit increase.

Figure 3. **About 50% of all visas were issued in the Russian Federation, Ukraine and China. Visas issued in the Russian Federation, China and Belarus showed significant increases**



Source: European Commission



Table 3. The number of visas issued in the Russian Federation increased significantly for many Member States between 2010 and 2011

Member State	Third country	2010	2011	% share of total
Finland	Russian Federation	952 056	1 182 876	8.8%
Spain	Russian Federation	461 367	699 815	5.2%
Italy	Russian Federation	456 209	579 492	4.3%
Greece	Russian Federation	374 558	513 223	3.8%
Bulgaria	Russian Federation	315 948	393 816	2.9%
Germany	Russian Federation	350 002	375 103	2.8%
Poland	Ukraine	302 266	369 893	2.7%
France	Russian Federation	295 421	339 253	2.5%
Czech Republic	Russian Federation	267 266	339 083	2.5%
Poland	Belarus	148 891	244 037	1.8%
France	China	198 898	237 679	1.8%
Italy	China	151 547	230 166	1.7%
Poland	Russian Federation	155 846	210 926	1.6%
Germany	China	184 374	208 287	1.5%
Bulgaria	Ukraine	102 505	157 162	1.2%
France	Algeria	125 934	154 180	1.1%
France	Morocco	136 575	147 884	1.1%
Lithuania	Russian Federation	120 464	147 760	1.1%
Lithuania	Belarus	106 451	144 328	1.1%
Germany	Turkey	124 130	141 114	1.0%
Other	Other	6 512 053	6 694 173	50%
Total		11 842 761	13 510 250	100%

Source: European Commission

Overstaying the legal visa period

There are no data available on the rate of people who arrive on short-term visas but do not depart before their visa expires (overstaying). However, experiences from countries implementing entry-exit systems, like Australia or Thailand, showed that such indicator can be useful for decision-makers when assessing visa applications. Indeed, it is generally believed that overstaying is a very common *modus operandi* for irregular migration to the EU.

Visa refusals

The consulate competent for dealing with visa applications assesses:

1. whether the applicant fulfils the entry conditions;
2. the risk of irregular immigration;
3. the applicant's intention to leave the territory of the Member State before the expiry of the visa;
4. whether the applicant presents a risk to the security or public health of the Member State.

As a result, some visa applications are refused. There are no data on the reasons for refusals of visa applications, but the overall refusal rate for visa applications may be determined per third country where visas are issued. Combined with additional information and tailored to operational needs, the rate of refusals of visa in consulates may be used by border-control authorities to deter-

mine the countries of origin presenting the highest risk of irregular migration.

In 2011, about 6% of the 14 373 334 visa applications were rejected. This proportion rose to 32% for applications made in West Africa, and to 20% in the Caribbean. Visa refusal rates varied widely between Member States, from 17% of 242 857 applications in Belgium to 1% of 1 259 643 applications in Finland.

UK visas

In 2011 for the UK alone, data on entry clearance visas and admissions of those who are subject to immigration control coming to the UK for study, work and family reasons show that: student immigration has seen a general increase since 2005, rising particularly rapidly in 2009; work-related immigration has fallen overall since 2006; and family immigration has shown a slow overall decrease since 2006. The latest visa data for 2011 indicate the number of student visas has fallen since a peak in the year ending June 2010 and work visas have continued to fall after a slight increase in the year ending March 2011. Visas for family reasons also fell.

Excluding visitor and transit visas, 6% fewer visas were issued in 2011 (564 000) than in 2010 (597 000). However, there were a record 1.7 million visitor visas issued in 2011, 11% more than a year earlier (1.5 million).*

In total, the UK issued 2 272 891 visas, with a refusal rate of 12%. The UK Border Agency (UKBA) published extensive statistics on visas issued, including breakdown by nationalities, but also by categories of visa (work, student, family, other) and categories of sponsors, broken down by nationalities and places of delivery.

Resident permits

An EMN note released in September 2012** showed that more than 1.93 million first residence permits were issued in 2011, an increase of 15% compared to 2010. This total excludes Belgium, Cyprus and Poland, which amounted to some 188 400 residence permits in 2010. Most residence permits were issued by Italy (331 000) and France (193 400).

At EU level, the Single Permit Directive was adopted in December 2011. The new legislation provides for a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work on the territory of a Member State. Negotiations continued on the proposals for directives on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of seasonal employment and on conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer.

Infringement procedures for non-communication of national measures transposing the EU Blue Card Directive*** were launched in 2011 in respect of six Member States. In 2012, a second set of infringement procedures were launched in respect of five Member States.

3.3. Illegal border-crossing

Detections of illegal border-crossing along the EU's external borders sharply dropped in 2012 to 72 437 detections, a 49% decrease compared to 2011 due mainly to the combined effects of enhanced surveillance at the land border between Greece and Turkey, where detections decreased by 44%, and to a sharp drop in the Central Mediterranean, where detections fell from 59 000 in 2011, mostly in connection to the Arab Spring, to 10 379 in 2012 (-82%).

In the first half of 2012, detections in the Central Mediterranean area were much reduced

** European Migration Network Inform, *Developments in Legal Migration and Mobility in 2011, 2012*

*** Blue Card is an EU-wide work permit allowing high-skilled non-EU citizens to reside and work in the EU.

* UK Home Office, *Immigration Statistics, Summary of key facts, 2011*



compared to the peak period of February–September 2011 that registered most of the departures connected to people leaving Tunisia and Libya. Most detections of illegal border-crossing along the external borders were on the South-Eastern border of the EU. The situation changed drastically in August 2012 when the Greek authorities mobilised unprecedented resources at their land border with Turkey, including the deployment of 1 800 additional Greek Police Officers. Detections of illegal border-crossing rapidly dropped from about 2 000 in the first week of August to less than 10 per week in October 2012.

Looking at nationalities, despite an over 43% reduction compared to 2011, at 13 169 detections, Afghans still accounted for 18% of all detections of illegal border-crossing at EU level. The majority of these Afghan migrants was detected at the land border between Greece and Turkey, where detections fell after August 2012. Afghans continued to be detected making secondary movement across the Hungarian land border with Serbia.

In 2012, the nationality with the most dramatic change in the number of detections

were Syrians, both in terms of relative growth and absolute number, from 1 616 in 2011 to 7 903 in 2012 (+389%). A large majority of all detected Syrian migrants were reported from the Greek land border with Turkey. Migrants from Eritrea (5 038 detections in 2012, +67%) and Somalia (2 604, +66%) were increasingly detected in the Central Mediterranean route.

3.3.1. Routes


In the annual total for 2012, detections of illegal border-crossing on the Eastern Mediterranean route still accounted for the largest percentage of all detections (37 214, 51% of 2012 total). Many migrants who crossed the border illegally to Greece continue to other Member States, either through the land route across the Western Balkans, or through ferry links to Italy or by air to other Schengen Member States.

Throughout 2012, detections in the Central Mediterranean region steadily increased to reach an annual total of 10 379 (14% of the total). Most migrants were from sub-Saharan countries and departed from Libya.

In the Western Mediterranean area, at the land and sea borders between northern Africa and Spain, detections of illegal border-crossing totalled 6 397, representing a 24% decrease compared to 2011. This level is comparable to the detections reported in 2008 and 2010. Most migrants were Algerians or sub-Saharan departing from Morocco and Algeria.

In March 2012, Belarusian authorities appeared to relax their border surveillance, resulting in increased detections of illegal border-crossing in Lithuania and Poland. Compared to 2011, detections increased by 52% along the eastern land border, totalling nearly 1 600. However, as was the case in previous years, this total represented only a small fraction of all detections in the EU (2%).

Figure 4. At EU level, while Afghans continued to rank first, Syrians were the fastest growing nationality detected for illegal border-crossing between 2011 and 2012



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

Table 4. Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs

Routes	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Eastern Mediterranean route (Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus)	55 688	57 025	37 224	51	-35
Land	49 513	55 558	32 854		-41
Afghanistan	21 389	19 308	7 973		-59
Syria	495	1 216	6 216		411
Bangladesh	1 496	3 541	4 598		30
Sea	6 175	1 467	4 370		198
Afghanistan	1 373	310	1 593		414
Syria	139	76	906		1 092
Palestine	1 500	128	408		219
Central Mediterranean route (Italy and Malta)	1 662	59 002	10 379	14	-82
Somalia	82	1 400	3 394		142
Tunisia	650	27 964	2 244		-92
Eritrea	55	641	1 889		195
Western Mediterranean route	5 003	8 448	6 397	8.8	-24
Sea	3 436	5 103	3 558		-30
Algeria	1 242	1 037	1 048		1.1
Morocco	300	775	364		-53
Chad	46	230	262		14
Land	1 567	3 345	2 839		-15
Not specified	1 108	2 610	1 410		-46
Algeria	459	735	967		32
Morocco	0	0	144		n.a.
Western Balkan route	2 371	4 658	6 391	8.8	37
Afghanistan	469	983	1 665		69
Kosovo*	372	498	942		89
Pakistan	39	604	861		43
Circular route from Albania to Greece	35 297	5 269	5 502	7.6	4.4
Albania	32 451	5 022	5 398		7.5
ŷROM	49	23	36		57
Kosovo*	21	37	34		-8.1
Apulia and Calabria (Italy)	2 788	5 259	4 772	6.6	-9.3
Afghanistan	1 664	2 274	1 705		-25
Pakistan	53	992	1 156		17
Bangladesh	12	209	497		138
Eastern borders route	1 052	1 049	1 597	2.2	52
Georgia	144	209	328		57
Somalia	48	120	263		119
Afghanistan	132	105	200		90
Western African route	196	340	174	0.2	-49
Morocco	179	321	104		-68
Gambia	1	2	39		1 850
Senegal	2	4	15		275
Other	3	1	1	0	0
Iran	0	0	1		n.a.
Russian Federation	2	0	0		n.a.
Somalia	0	1	0		-100
Total	104 060	141 051	72 437		-49

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013




Figure 5. **Detections of illegal border-crossing along the EU's external borders plunged in 2012 mainly due to enhanced surveillance at the Greek-Turkish land border and a sharp drop in the Central Mediterranean**

■ Eastern Mediterranean route

Since data collection began in early 2008, the Eastern Mediterranean has maintained its status as a hotspot of irregular migration. Detections have followed a remarkably seasonal pattern invariably peaking in the third quarter of each year and concentrated at the border between Greece and Turkey. However, following the implementation of a set of Greek operations in August 2012 as well as the continued implementation of Fron-

tex-coordinated JOs (Aeneas, Hermes and Poseidon Sea), by the end of the year, detections dropped off to almost negligible levels. The operation Xenios Zeus focuses on inland detections of illegal stay in Greece and their subsequent return, while the operation Aspida enhances the surveillance on the Greek-Turkish land border.

The operational activities included:

- (a) deployment of a 1 881 additional Police Officers to the Evros region and tech-

Figure 6. Enhanced border controls at the land border between Greece and Turkey significantly reduced detections of illegal border-crossing up to December 2012, resulting in only small displacements to alternative routes



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013 and JORA data as of 9 February 2013

- nical assets at the Greek-Turkish land border aimed at increasing surveillance and response capacity to tackle illegal border-crossing;
- (b) creation of significant additional capacity for hosting irregular migrants in detention centres in order to be able to facilitate identification and return;
- (c) use of new tactics for border surveillance and improved cooperation with the Turkish authorities at the border;
- (d) reduction in the time period for which irregular migrants have to leave Greece if not held in detention centres from 30 to 7 days; and
- (e) inland activities for the detection of irregular migrants on Greek territory.

As a result, from 6 August 2012 onwards the number of apprehensions significantly dropped at the Greek-Turkish land border. The operations produced a slight shift to the Bulgarian land border and the sea border with Turkey. Italy reported a few detections of migrants attempting to cross directly from Turkey, and at EU level, Member States also reported a small increase in detections

of migrants with fraudulent documents on flights departing from Istanbul. However, these increases in detections on alternative route to the land border between Turkey and Greece, do not match previous levels, as seen in Figure 6.

The operations were initially planned for a three month period, but were then renewed in October 2012 for another three month period. In January 2013, the Greek authorities announced the 3rd phase of the operation Aspida, which will run until 3 April 2013 with 1100 police officers deployed in Evros region.

Partial shift to sea borders

Detections in the Aegean Sea, between Turkey and Greece, increased by 912%. This increasing trend started after September 2012, as migrants considered sea crossing as an alternative to the land route to Greece. It is indeed at the sea borders where the most significant shift in detections of illegal border-crossing was reported. The increase started immediately following the enhanced surveillance at the land border.



Worryingly, detections were still relatively large at the end of year, despite the winter conditions that makes sea crossing more treacherous. This may signal a resurgence of the pressure in the Aegean Sea after three years of relatively low detections. Indeed, in 2009, the Aegean Sea was the main area for detections of illegal border-crossing into the EU.

Migrants detected in the Aegean Sea were mainly apprehended inland after their arrival from the western coast of Turkey, while a small number of migrants were apprehended directly at sea trying to reach the Greek Aegean Islands. The most targeted islands were Lesbos, Samos, Agathonisi, Farmakonisi and Symi. Most migrants had departed from Izmir on the Western Turkish coast.

The Turkish authorities have also stepped up their surveillance efforts, with the Turkish Coast Guards intercepting migrants in rubber boats and vessels before they reach the Greek territorial waters.

In the Ionian Sea, there was no significant increase after August 2012. Most of the migrants detected in the Ionian Sea had departed from Greece, after having crossed the border illegally between Turkey and Greece.

Partial shift to the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey

Since systematic data collection began in early 2008, detections of illegal border-crossing at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border were rather low. The situation changed in 2012, when a total of around four times as many migrants were apprehended. This increase is connected to the strengthening of border control at the Greek-Turkish land border, where most migrants used to cross illegally into the EU, in August 2012.

The main nationalities apprehended in Bulgaria during 2012 were Syrians, Palestinians, Iraqis, Algerians and Malians. Up until August there were very few sub-Saharan migrants detected at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border; however, from the beginning of the Greek operation Aspida until end of December 2012, their number rose to represent 16% of all detections. Most sub-Saharan migrants had arrived legally in Turkey by air (most of them either do not need visa or can easily obtain it on arrival in Turkey).

Following this increase, the Bulgarian authorities quickly reacted in October 2012 by setting-up a Specialised Police Operation at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border in the areas of the Border Police Units of Svilengrad and Elhovo, deploying additional officers, patrol cars and service dogs along the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Measures have also been taken to enhance air surveillance.

These actions complement the efforts of the Bulgarian authorities to implement an Integrated Border Surveillance System at the border section between the BCP Kapitan Andreevo and Lesovo. The system covers 58 km of the most affected section of the Bulgarian-Turkish land border. The Bulgarian authorities are planning to extend the system to cover the entire border section.

Staying in Turkey

Given the rather limited shift in detections of migrants crossing illegally from Turkey, it is also likely that a substantial proportion of migrants failing or not trying to enter the EU prefer to stay in Turkey, rather than returning to their more unstable and substantially poorer home countries. Although lacking residency status, and, therefore, vulnerable to exploitation, they may find jobs in specific niches in the Turkish informal sector, tourism, petty trade, construction and agriculture.

Nationalities on the Eastern Mediterranean route

There was some variation in the extent to which detections of different nationalities decreased in response to the operations. However, the deterring effect was the least pronounced in the case of Syrians as the detections of this nationality were the last to decrease and the scale of their decline was the smallest. In the second half of 2012, Syrians were by far the most detected nationality in this area.

Although not reflected in the analysis of the top nationalities, the number of Algerians detected crossing illegally the border on the Eastern Mediterranean route in 2012 (2 223 detections) was larger than the number of Algerians detected on the Western Mediterranean route (2 015 detections), which is their traditional route with direct departure from the Algerian coast. This shift is explained by cheap flight connections from Algeria to Turkey and the easiness to obtain Turkish visa.


Afghan migrants

Some reports state that in Iran there are currently 2–4 million displaced Afghans who have been residing there for several years. However, an agreement of the Iranian government to provide Afghans with documents to legalise their stay and provide permission to work has recently expired, rendering many Afghan nationals as illegal stayers in Iran. Hence, many now-irregular migrants in this situation are coming to the EU.

Pakistani migrants

Most migrants coming to the EU from Pakistan via the Greek-Turkish border, are single, male adults between the ages of 21 and 29, non-skilled Urdu-speaking workers and students. When illegally crossing the external border they tend to travel undocumented.

Figure 7. Following enhanced control at the Greek-Turkish land border, Syrians were the last to decrease. Compared to 2011, detections of Syrians actually increased the most, while detections of Afghans and Pakistanis significantly dropped in 2012



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

The passports are often withheld by facilitators in Turkey with the assurance that they will be sent to other facilitators in Greece.

The most frequent place of origin is the northern part of the Punjab province. According to the statements provided in interviews, the destination countries are Greece, Italy and Spain, but considering the number of returned Pakistani nationals, the UK could be the main final destination country. The main Member States reporting the effective return of Pakistanis were the UK and Greece.

The main reason why Pakistanis choose to migrate to the EU is economic, because of a lack of employment opportunities and very low salaries in Pakistan.

Bangladeshi migrants

Most of the Bangladeshi migrants interviewed after having illegally crossed the Greek-Turkish land border claimed that they had departed from countries around the Persian




Figure 8. **Most migrants from Bangladesh detected during JO Poseidon Land travelled overland from the Gulf States**

Gulf, where they had been legally working in the construction business. Following the economic crisis in the area, salaries fell and fewer jobs were available; consequently, many migrants decided to try to reach the EU in search of better employment opportunities. It was established that facilitators working in the Gulf area deceptively assured the migrants that there were plenty of good jobs and high salaries in Greece.

The Bangladeshi migrants travelled by car to Oman, from where they crossed the Gulf of Oman to Iran in fast speedboats. From Bandar-E-Abbas they travelled on buses and in vans to Teheran, where they joined the flow of mostly Afghan and Pakistani migrants arriving from the east. From Teheran, the migrants were transported to

Urmia and then crossed the Iranian-Turkish border in large groups of up to 1 000 migrants, and headed towards Van. In Van, migrants received false Turkish documents and used a regular bus connection to get to Istanbul. From there, facilitators transported them to the River Evros, or alternative routes.

Syrian migrants

While the increasing number of detections of illegal border-crossing is generally linked to the internal situation in Syria, the prevailing profile of Syrians detected at the Greek-Turkish border remains somewhat different to the refugee flow from Syria into Turkey. Also, roughly 15% of Syrians detected at the Greek-Turkish border during 2012 were in fact not native to Syria. These false claims of nationality often occur in conjunction with new or emerging crises and are linked to nationalities with common linguistic and/or geographical origin. In this case, migrants falsely claiming Syrian nationality were mostly Iraqis and, to a lesser extent, also Egyptians, Moroccans, Libyans and Tunisians.

Syrians detected crossing the border illegally in Greece were predominantly male (74%), while the UNHCR data for the refugee flow into the neighbouring countries suggest that 75% were women and children. While there were also family units detected, the majority of Syrians arriving in Greece were youths aged between 20 and 28.

The main areas of departure from Syria were the north-west around the city of Aleppo, the north-east around the city of Al Qamishli and the capital Damascus. Migrants tended to use cars and buses for legal entry to Turkey. With the help of Syrian facilitators some also enter Turkey illegally on foot, although this is an exception. Importantly, while on route to Greece, Syrians do not usually seek international protection in Turkey.

Some Syrians departing from Damascus tended to travel legally to Beirut, fly to Istanbul and from there continue their journey to Greece with the help of the facilitators. While staying in Istanbul, Syrians made contact with facilitators.

A German court ruled early in 2012 that Syrian nationals applying for international protection are to be granted automatic refugee status on the grounds that the very act of leaving Syria presumably illegally, and then asking for international protection may, upon return to Syria, result in torture and imprisonment. Sweden also declared that Syrian nationals claiming for asylum would also be automatically granted protection, while other Member States are reviewing their policies.

Secondary movements

Greece is a Schengen exclave and a transit rather than destination country for the majority of migrants. Thus, the secondary movements originating in Greece are characterised by a similar composition of nationalities of migrants attempting to re-enter the Schengen area heading for their final destinations as those who enter Greece. In 2012, these movements tended to be reflected in the detections of:

- 1) illegal border-crossing throughout the Western Balkan land borders;
- 2) migrants landing at the blue border of the southern Italian regions of Apulia and Calabria;
- 3) clandestines and document fraudsters on board ferries to Italy (Ancona, Venice);
- 4) document fraudsters travelling on flights from Greek airports to many major EU airports.

Illegal border-crossing throughout the Western Balkan land borders: There were almost 35 000 detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs reported at borders

between Western Balkan countries themselves or at their borders with the neighbouring Member States. The number was one third higher compared to 2011. Among the top five border sections, Croatia-Slovenia reported the highest increases (+95%) between 2011 and 2012. Afghans continued to dominate the nationalities ranking with a 23% share of the total. Their numbers rose by almost 10% to 8 065, however, the highest relative increases between 2011 and 2012 were reported by Syrians (+1 689%), Somalis (+223%) and Algerians.

Worth mentioning is also the fact that many more migrants opted for clandestine entry (hiding in lorries or trains) during 2012 compared to 2011. In fact, Western Balkan countries and the neighbouring Member States detected almost 1 676 or 87% more persons hiding in vehicles while trying to cross borders illegally. The top border section was Serbia-former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where authorities on both sides of the border detected 25% more than during 2011. As in the case for green border crossings, Afghans were the top nationality with a 45% share of the total.

Migrants landing at the blue border of the southern Italian regions of Apulia and Calabria: In 2012, there was a steady flow of Afghans and, to a lesser extent, Pakistanis arriving in the southern Italian blue borders of Calabria and Apulia with some very large increases during the third quarter of 2012. The most commonly detected migrants were from Afghanistan, representing a steady share of about 30%. Detections of migrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Syria increased very sharply since the beginning of 2012.

Many migrants indicated that they had initially entered the Schengen area by crossing the land border between Greece and Turkey. In 2011, it was estimated that more than 15% of migrants reported at the Greek-Turkish



land border were afterwards detected in Apulia and Calabria.

Increasing numbers of other migrants, usually from Asia, claim to have been living in Greece for a number of years before deciding to leave for other Member States because of the economic crisis. Some of the migrants stated that they had been working in agriculture jobs for EUR 25–30 per day, but many did not receive any salary for a certain period which prompted their decision to leave.

Document fraudsters travelling on flights from Greek airports to many major EU airports: In 2012, there were more than 500 detections of migrants travelling on intra-Schengen flights with fraudulent documents. These intra-Schengen document fraudsters were mostly detected by Italy (entry and exit) and Greece (exit), where numbers were increasing throughout 2012 and, to a lesser extent, by Germany (entry), where numbers were decreasing.

Following recent increases, Syrians were the most detected nationality on intra-Schengen flights followed by Afghans and Somalis.


■ Central Mediterranean route

In the Central Mediterranean area, the large and suddenly increased number of detections in 2011, following the turmoil in Tunisia and Libya, had been significantly reduced by the end of 2011. However, throughout 2012, detections steadily increased and by the end of the year they totalled more than 10 000 detections. Most migrants were from sub-Saharan countries (particularly Eritrea and Somalia) and departed from Libya.

The institutional capacity to tackle irregular migration in North Africa remains limited. Libya is of the biggest concern in this respect given its fractured, with four regions declared military zones, non-consolidated and difficult-to-govern emerging institutional framework. The country is still plagued with frequent killings and kidnappings.

In the Central Mediterranean area, migrants illegally crossing the borders to the EU used a wide variety of boats, ranging from small rubber dinghies up to medium-size wooden fishing boats. Fishing boats departing from Libya were more difficult to find after the wake of departures during

Figure 9. In 2012, there was a steady increase in detections on the Central Mediterranean route, mostly sub-Saharan departures from Libya



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

the 'Arab Spring', and are often overloaded. Rubber boats, the cheapest alternative to the wooden fishing boats, are prone to capsizing in high-sea conditions and have often been equipped with poor engines, two factors contributing to increasingly put migrant lives at risk. From Tunisia, migrants sailing without facilitation often do so aboard small rubber boats, whereas facilitation networks continue to advertise sea crossings on wooden fishing boats.

Most migrants departed from Libya and about a quarter had left from Tunisia and a minority from Egypt.

In addition, a few migrants detected near Sicily and the southern Italian coast mentioned that they had left from Turkey or were detected after transiting through the Greek Island of Crete, sometimes arriving in Crete from Athens.

From Tunisia

The number of Tunisians detected on the Central Mediterranean route significantly dropped after September 2012, when an agreement was reached between Italy and Tunisia to repatriate up to 100 Tunisians per week. This also coincided with rougher sea conditions and the capsizing of a boat soon after its departure during which as many as 50 casualties have been reported. All these factors contributed to deter many Tunisians from illegally crossing the Mediterranean Sea.

While most departures from Tunisia in the first half of the year took place from southern Tunisia, there was a shift to more departures from the northern part of the country as of September, most probably due to the worsening weather conditions south and west of the Pelagic Islands.

The decreasing trend in departures from Tunisia is expected to be reinforced by enhanced patrol capacities of the Tunisian authorities. In December, Tunisia received two patrol boats, from the Italian Ministry of Interior to support the fight against clandestine migration from Tunisia to Italy. A third boat of the same type will be handed over in early 2013.

From Libya

Most sub-Saharan migrants detected in the Central Mediterranean area in particular from Eritrea and Somalia, reported to have departed from Libya, in particular from the coastal areas near Tripoli, Zawiyah and Benghazi.

Different routes are used to bring the migrants to the Libyan border. In some cases, migrants have been reported leaving as far away as Chad.

From Egypt

In 2012, the first detections for illegal border-crossing in the Central Mediterranean area from Egypt occurred in April. Alexandria was mentioned as the main area for departures. Most migrants were promptly readmitted to Egypt.


Nationalities on the Central Mediterranean route

Somali migrants

Most detected Somalis were young males (18–24 years) with secondary education and low or no income. The main reason for the migration was socio-economic, but in some cases it was military conflict. Many Somali migrants mentioned escaping the threat of the terrorist group Al Shabab.



Figure 10. The largest annual increases were reported for migrants from the Horn of Africa, in particular from Somalia and Eritrea



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

Most Somalis were detected by Italian authorities, but in the second quarter of 2012, the arrival of Somali migrants in Malta increased significantly to almost 600 during that quarter. They had been promised that they would be brought to Italy. In the past, Malta resettled some Somali migrants in the United States and in some Member States, which might be a pull factor.

Somali migrants are also among the most commonly detected nationalities using fraudulent documents on intra-Schengen flights.

Eritrean migrants

Many Eritrean nationals, after leaving their home either to avoid military service or in the hope of finding better living conditions, gather in Kassala and then spend some time in the UN refugee camp in Shagarab. They then move further to Khartoum, where they stay a few months or years either in employment or trying to find some type of job.

Once they decide to travel further, typically Sudanese and Eritrean facilitators assist them to reach the border with Libya. In Tripoli the local facilitation networks take over the facilitation arrangements.

Tunisian migrants

Most Tunisian migrants were young (18–29 years) unmarried males with a primary level of education and low incomes. Many Tunisians have relatives or friends in the EU ready to help them settle in, especially in Italy. Tunisian migrants typically arrived undocumented to avoid readmission because Italy and Tunisia cooperate with regard to the repatriation of documented Tunisians. After reaching Italy, they continue their journey to other Member States; the majority travel to France as they speak French.

Egyptian migrants

Mostly Egyptian migrants detected crossing the Mediterranean Sea to the EU are young males (16–19 years), looking for economic opportunities in the EU or escaping the current tensions between Coptic and Muslim communities. Most of them rely on facilitation network operating in Alexandria. Once detected for illegal border-crossing, they are returned to Egypt under bilateral agreements.

■ Western Mediterranean route (sea, Ceuta and Melilla land)

In the Western Mediterranean area, between northern Africa and Spain, detection for illegal border-crossing totalled 6 397, representing a 24% decrease compared to 2011, a level comparable to the detections reported between 2008 and 2010. Most migrants were Algerians and sub-Saharan departures from Morocco and Algeria.

Nationalities on the Western Mediterranean route

Moroccan and Algerian migrants

Moroccan and Algerian migrants were mostly single male adults aged 18–30 but also a few minors. They spoke Arabic and, to a lesser extent, French or English; having relatives or friends in Member States, mainly in France, Belgium, Germany and Spain, who would help them find a job and settle within the ethnic communities already established in these countries. They were suffering from a generalised lack of economic opportunities.

Sub-Saharan migrants (mostly departing from Morocco)

While Moroccans themselves still wish to migrate to the EU, Morocco can be a comparatively stable and wealthy country for sub-Saharan migrants. Typically for transitional countries, Morocco is likely to attract sub-Saharans to migrate and settle in Morocco, facilitated by reduced travel costs and the increased demand for low and high-skilled migrant labour.* This trend was confirmed by several reports of migrants who indicated that an increasing number of migrants, including women and children, from sub-Saharan African countries illegally enter Morocco with the assistance of smugglers.

Most sub-Saharans were single adults aged 25–35. In general, they had a low level of education with a limited knowledge of French and/or English. Most travelled through several African countries where they worked before arriving in Morocco; almost all of them were undocumented to avoid repatriation after their disembarkation to Spain. Most had relatives or friends in Member States, mainly in Spain, France and Germany. Some of them claimed socio-economic reasons as well as fleeing from social unrest and armed conflicts in their home countries as the main motives

for migrating. Less frequent factors for migrating were religious persecution and the marginalisation of women. However, compared to previous years there appeared an increasing number of pregnant women and children, raising the concern that an increasing number of migrants embarking on this route might end up in the hands of organised crime groups (OCGs) involved in trafficking in human beings. However, during the border-crossing, no link could be established between their smuggling and possible trafficking in human beings.

Modus operandi

Sea crossing

The boats departing from Algeria or Morocco were mostly rubber dinghies, and fibre glass boats. In the Strait of Gibraltar, on average 8–12 migrants were detected on rubber boats that normally have a limited capacity of four persons.

Most migrants departed from the coastal area between Tangiers and Ceuta. From Algeria, the cities of Mostaganem, Oran and Chlef form a triangle where the facilitators recruit, accommodate and organise the sea crossing. The coastal area between Ghazaouet and Orán is the main departure area used in order to reach the coast of Almeria. Mostaganem, located on the north coast of Algeria between Orán and Tenés, is used to reach Murcia.

Land crossing

Due to the repeated attempts of illegal border-crossing by sub-Saharan migrants towards Melilla and Ceuta, the Moroccan Army and Royal Gendarmerie strengthened the police surveillance in the north of the country.

In October 2012, the Spanish authorities reported several attempts by migrants to


* Hamburg Institute of International Economics, *Focus migration: Country profile: Morocco, 2009.*



scale the fence to the enclave of Melilla. Some of the attempts took place in broad daylight, resulting in more than 300 people crossing the border illegally. Most of the migrants were of sub-Saharan origin and succeeded in jumping the barrier around the Oro River. The autonomous city of Melilla has reinforced security along the border to try to stem illegal border-crossing, deploying 40 additional Civil Guard officers, according to the government's delegate in Melilla. According to media reports, the migrants jumped the six-metre fence equipped with sticks and stones, which they used to threaten civil guards.

This assault over the fence resulted in the local open centre of Immigrant Temporary Stay Centre (CETI) becoming quickly overcrowded. At one point, there were 853 people staying in the centre which only has capacity for 480. Collaboration with Moroccan security forces was crucial in foiling migrants' attempts to scale the fences. After October, no other incident was reported.

Figure 11. **Detections of Afghans and Pakistanis increased between 2011 and 2012 on the Western Balkan route**



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

■ Western African route

The police and repatriation agreements that Spain signed with Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco and the consequent high level of cooperation between the Spanish, Senegalese and Mauritanian authorities performing joint patrols at sea and on the coastline of Senegal and Mauritania have been a significant deterrent factor in preventing irregular migration flows from Senegal and Mauritania towards the Canary Islands. JO Hera throughout the past 6 years has contributed to close cooperation and daily coordination among the authorities involved in preventing irregular immigration.

The level of the detections of illegal border-crossing towards the Canary Islands remained very low indeed in 2012 mostly opportunity driven and regional, as the vast majority of arrivals concerned Moroccan nationals. This represents a steady declining trend from the peak in 2006 of more than 31 600 migrants arriving illegally in the Canary Islands.

■ Western Balkan route

The Western Balkan route remained largely a function of the transiting flow of migrants that enter the EU at the Greek-Turkish borders and later continue towards other Member States through the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia. Migrants travelling within the EU from Greece and further on to other destination Member States usually use the fastest possible route to re-enter the Schengen area (Hungary or Slovenia).

Green border crossing

Considering also detections reported by Western Balkan countries within the Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network, there were almost 35 000 detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs reported by West-

ern Balkan countries and their neighbouring Member States during 2012. The number was 33% higher compared to 2011. Serbia was by far the top reporting country in the region with a 40% share of detections

Nationalities on the Western Balkan route

In fact, most of the growth was linked to secondary movements of Afghans, Pakistanis, Algerians, Somalis, Syrians and Moroccans en route from Greece to other Member States. Detections of Albanian nationals (Albanian circular migration to Greece) remained stable in comparison with 2011.

It is notable that the numbers of detections of illegal border-crossing by Serbia and Croatia in the fourth quarter were higher than of any Member State, including Greece.

More than two-thirds of all detections continued to be linked to migrants who have entered the Western Balkans en route from Greece. In terms of nationalities, Afghans remained the largest nationality with more than 8 000 detections. The number of detected Syrians continued to increase strongly during the last quarter of 2012. By the end of 2012, there were 1 646 Syrians detected for illegal border-crossing compared to only 92 during 2011.

By the end of 2012, nationals of Eritrea were the fastest growing group of migrants: their number rose from only 20 in the third quarter to more than 300 during the fourth quarter. Similarly nationals of Mali grew from only 3 in the third quarter to 78 in the fourth quarter.

Variations in *modi operandi*

There is considerable variation in the *modus operandi* considering the points of departure (either straight from Greece or in several legs inside the Western Balkans) and types of vehicles used (cars, buses, cargo/passenger trains).

The route straight from Greece via Western Balkan countries to the EU appears to be more costly and organised, while the route made in several legs through Western Balkan countries is cheaper and perhaps more improvised. Inside the Western Balkan countries vehicles are most probably entered at the truck stops. However, according to the observations by the Western Balkan countries, the lorry drivers are usually not aware that they are carrying irregular migrants.

These trends continue to suggest that more migrants en route from Greece are opting for crossing the regional and common borders hidden in vehicles. This *modus operandi* contains a high risk of loss of life, especially when closed hidden compartments are used in cars, buses, trains, and containers.

Number of asylum applications to circumvent entry provisions continued at increasing pace

Overall asylum applications by the migrants en route from Greece increased substantially in most Western Balkan countries. Most notably, the increase was extremely high in Montenegro +543%. Claiming asylum in Western Balkans itself and absconding afterwards continues to grow as a part of the *modus operandi* to move from Greece towards other Member States (secondary movements).

■ Eastern land borders route

The eastern land borders route is, in effect, an amalgam of detections of illegal border-crossing reported by Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Finland and Latvia. Despite the total length of all the border sections, detections tend to be lower than on other routes possibly due to the long distances between major hubs and many countries of origins. Also visa fraud and counterfeit border-crossing stamps tend to predominate



on this route, as opposed to detections of illegal border-crossing.

The number of detections of Somalis at the Slovakian land border with Ukraine represented a steady long-term increase over many years.

■ Other routes

There was very little detection for illegal border-crossing elsewhere in the EU. In the Baltic Sea region, Member States reported only 25 detections in 2012. These detections were related to very few events. In this region, the main issue for authorities patrolling the blue border is the non-systematic control of pleasure boats.

3.3.2. Clandestine entry

Detections of illegal border-crossing at (rather than between) BCPs are restricted to the external land and sea borders of the EU and to detections that are confirmed clandestine entries (e.g. hiding in means of transport). Their volume is extremely low for the whole of the EU, with 605 detections in 2012, especially compared with other indicators, such

as detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs (72 437). However, the 2012 total is still the highest number of clandestine entry detections since data collection began for this indicator in 2009.

This method requires migrants to stay in confinement for long periods of time, and is known to put migrants lives at risk of suffocation and dehydration. Therefore, most of the migrants detected hiding in vehicles at BCPs are single young males, and do not travel in more-vulnerable family groups.

There were also more detections within the EU/Schengen area (3 467), which was also the highest number recorded in recent years. The geographical distribution of those detections sheds light on the direction of secondary movements and the final destination countries selected by specific nationalities. For example, Italy, the UK and Romania reported the greatest number of internally detected clandestine migrants, mostly Afghans, Albanians and Algerians. For smuggling within the EU, there are reports that the ferry route between the Greek ports of Patras and Igoumenitsa towards Italy are important, as are routes from ports heading towards the UK.

In Italy, most Afghans were detected making secondary movements on ferries arriving in Venice from Greece, as well as recent increases in the number of Palestinians on ferries arriving in Venice and Ancona, where both nationalities are often also detected with fraudulent documents.

Modus operandi

In vehicles

In 2012, clandestine entry in lorries was one of the most frequent and increasingly detected methods. A large proportion of the clandestines were detected with carbon dioxide detection or heartbeat detection devices.



© Frontex 2012

Figure 12. **In 2012, hiding in means of transport accounted for less than 1% of detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

At the BCPs on the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey, a big part of clandestine entry is associated with the annual movement of Turkish 'guest workers', (about two million pass annually through Kapitan Andreevo and Lesovo BCPs) going to and from Turkey mainly to Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Many of these migrants try to smuggle relatives through the Bulgarian border (between two and three attempts are detected each day during peak times of the year – May to September).*

In the Western Balkans, detections of migrants hiding in vehicles continued to increase in 2012. There were almost 1 676 (87% increase compared to 2011) migrants detected in vehicles at different regional BCPs while trying to clandestinely avoid border checks.

On trains

Detections of clandestine on trains concerned relatively few of the BCPs along the EU's external borders. However, in 2012, Member States reported increasing reports of migrants hiding on trains as part of the secondary movements of migrants who initially entered illegally into the EU via Turkey.

In Romania, there was a significant increase in the number of migrants hidden in the means of transport, mainly because many migrants who entered at the border with Serbia and applied for asylum subsequently left the asylum centres and were then discovered hidden in trains exiting towards Hungary. Many of them tried to board the trains going to Hungary after the border checks had been performed.

Another emerging trend in 2012 is the detections of secondary movement of migrants hiding in trains from Thessaloniki (Greece) to Linz (Austria).

In containers / ships

Detections of migrants hiding in containers on ships are low, and confined to the largest container ports of the EU. Yet, in some ports, like in the port of Algeciras, there are regular detections, mostly associated with migrants hiding in lorries on the ferries between Morocco and Spain.

3.4. Detections of facilitators

Despite an increase from 6 957 in 2011 to 7 720 in 2012, the long term trend for detections of facilitators of irregular migration has been falling. In 2008 and 2009, there were more than 9 000 detections.

According to some reports, this long-term decline may in part be due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and document fraud to mimic legal entry to the EU, which results in facilitators being able to operate remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompanying migrants during high-risk activities such as border-crossing.

The total EU-level detections of facilitators of irregular migration tend to be made up of several disparate trends involving unrelated nationalities detected in different Member States. For example, despite a decline in detections compared to the year previously, France reported the most detections of facilitators, whereas Spain ranked second at EU level. Hungary reported a large increase, mostly of Serbs and Hungarians detected inland and at the border with Serbia. This increase is most probably connected to facilitation of secondary movements of migrants, after they have entered Greece illegally from Turkey.

Member States tend to detect more domestic facilitators than any other nationality; in 2012, all of the top three reporting countries for this indicator reported their own citizens

* Center for the Study of Democracy, *Better Management of EU borders through Cooperation*, 2011



as facilitators more frequently than any other single nationality. Among the countries reporting the most facilitators this propensity was strongest in Italy and Spain, where about a third of all detected facilitators were of their own nationals. In France, this proportion is about a fifth of all detections.

In 2012, there were several investigations that led to a number of important arrests. In many cases, the investigations revealed that facilitators, not only provide assistance to cross the border illegally, but also facilitate the stay of irregular migrants in Member States by providing fraudulent documents.

In Spain, an investigation launched in March resulted in the arrest of ten facilitators who had been smuggling migrants from Turkey to Greece. Once inside the Schengen area, migrants were supplied with residence permits through marriage or domestic partnership with citizens. Apparently, this organisation was also actively engaged in narcotics trafficking.

In Italy, there were several developments in relation to migrant smuggling from Egypt and through the Western Balkans. For example, the police dismantled a criminal organisation that operated for years between Egypt and the Sicilian coastline. Also, a well branched criminal organisation which operated between Turkey and Italy was dismantled during the reporting period. This group used the Western Balkan route, aimed at the illegal entry of Turkish citizens who crossed the land border between Italy and Slovenia hidden aboard vehicles and/or using false documents.

A Chinese people-smuggling network, operating European-wide, was dismantled by the French Police (OCRIEST) in June 2012, with Europol's support. Eleven suspects were arrested. Another facilitator had previously been arrested in the UK. The network smuggled Chinese irregular migrants from France,

Spain and Portugal to Ireland and the UK using forged passports from different Asian countries. After several intercepted smuggling attempts, and the arrest of some of the organisers, the network changed their *modus operandi* and started smuggling the migrants hidden in the trunks of cars loaded on lorries.

As is true for other serious organised crimes, facilitators of irregular migration make an extensive use of the internet according to Europol reports. It allows OCGs to get information about legislation, procedures, etc., and can be used for recruitment of migrants, to transfer money and to engage in anonymous communication. In China, for example, agencies use Chinese websites and newspapers to market immigration to specific Member States as a way of gaining social benefits or the possibility to move freely within Schengen. Diaspora communities in destination countries can be a facilitator for recruitment. In addition, some asylum centres function as recruitment hubs, where OCGs find a large potential customer base for the onward smuggling route.

According to Europol, facilitation of irregular immigration is usually nationality- or ethnicity-based and the OCGs are hierarchically structured. The leader is responsible for the coordination of the smuggling throughout a certain territory, and has international contacts with other networks doing other parts of the smuggling action, and with coordinators in other countries. The leader coordinates drivers, guides, providers of accommodation often assisted by 'local agents'.

Local persons of the nationality of the transit country retain their importance on the executive level of the facilitation network. They are local guides to illegally cross the green borders. For example on the Balkan routes, the use of Serbian and Hungarian guides was reported. They can be drivers for local distances or for transportation into the destina-

tion country, for example Afghan organisers recruiting Romanian lorry drivers.

Leadership can also be based on family relationships. In some cases opportunistic individuals can also be involved in facilitation of irregular migration.

Europol also indicates that there is no specific link between the *modus operandi* and the nationality of the facilitator. For example, one Albanian-speaking OCG may be involved in clandestine entry, while another organise marriages of convenience.

3.5. Document fraud

Document fraud is widely acknowledged by the EU border-guard community to be a serious problem not only because it allows migrants in irregular or unlawful situations to enter the territory of a Member State, and potentially also to move freely within the Schengen area, but also because it make it possible for individuals to assume a bogus identity and operated within the black market. This seriously affects internal security, and undermines international criminal inves-


tigations, as well national social systems and the ability of any state to effectively manage and protect its legitimate communities. As modern documents require increasingly sophisticated and expensive techniques to produce quality forgeries, document fraudsters progressively need closer and stronger links to organised crime groups, which also increases their profits.

It is generally recognised that the abuse of travel documents fall in four broad categories:

- forgeries – previously authentic documents that have been tampered with;
- counterfeits – entirely manufactured documents made to resemble originals;
- fraudulently obtained documents – authentic documents that were issued based on fraudulent applications or supporting documents;
- impostors – authentic documents being used by an unauthorised user (look-alikes).

The abuse of EU passports is of particular concern because migrants using them may be subject to less rigorous checks at the external border, and because the document may be used to access social sys-

Figure 13. Following the deployment of the Greek operation Aspida in August 2012, document fraudsters of all nationalities (particularly Syrians) were increasingly detected arriving from Istanbul rather than Athens



Source: EDF-RAN data as of 12 February 2013



tems or be reused for other migrants to attempt illegal entry. Another major issue relates to fraudulently obtained visas, which raise particular challenges for first-line officers to detect, especially given linguistic differences and fact that migrants are often not required to cross the external border of the same Member State that issued the visa. Some of these issues will be addressed by the Visa Information System (VIS) which should be operational among issuing authorities across eleven regions by November 2013.

According to EDF-RAN data, in 2012 there were nearly 8 000 detections of migrants using fraudulent documents to illegally enter the EU/Schengen area from third countries, which is a substantial increase compared to previous years. Much of this increase was due to higher pressure at the external border in terms of migrants using, inter alia, counterfeit stamps or forged passports to

illegally enter Member States from third countries.

However, at least some of the increase can probably be attributed to a gradually increased focus on consistent and well-defined reporting within the framework of the EDF-RAN.

In previous years, most detections were made at the major EU airports, but in 2012 there were more detections at the external land (56%) than at both the air (39%) and sea borders (5%). The reason for the switch was a massive increase in the number of Albanian nationals detected at their land border with Greece, using counterfeit border-crossing stamps to fabricate travel histories and extend periods of stay. This trend, involving mostly circular migrants, would have begun in 2011 once Albanians were granted visa-free access to the Schengen area.

Albanians were also increasingly detected travelling from the Schengen to the UK and, to a lesser extent, to Ireland.

Away from the land border, detections tended to be focused at the major international airports, with Fiumicino (FCO), Lisbon (LIS), Madrid (MAD), Brussels (BRU) and Frankfurt (FRA) detecting the most individuals on arrival. Each of the top airports detected more passports than any other document, mostly forgeries, but at Lisbon more authentic passports (unknown nationalities) and at Frankfurt more counterfeit passports (Syrians) were detected than any other type of fraud. Among these passport holders, most airports detected a wide variety of nationalities throughout 2012, with particularly noticeable numbers of Bangladeshi migrants detected in Fiumicino, Syrians in Frankfurt, Fiumicino and Warsaw, and Congolese (DMR) in Brussels.

The European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network

Despite the recognised seriousness of document fraud, until recently there was no regular or consolidated information exchange among Member States and there were no overall analyses of trends in the field of document fraud at EU level. To address this information gap and following on from the success of an earlier pilot study, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN) was formed in early 2012 to serve as a platform for information exchange among Member States.

Overseen by Frontex, during 2012 some 28 Member States/Schengen Associated Countries met and exchanged information on several occasions, and instigated and maintained a detailed and complex monthly data-exchange programme covering all detections of document fraud at the external borders and on all international flights. Data were exchanged detailing the migrant, the document and the route taken – all at the level of individual events.

Nationalities of document fraudsters

Albanians were the most commonly detected nationality using document fraud to illegally enter the EU/Schengen area from a third country. The other top five nationalities were Syrian (see section on Syrian migrants), Moroccan, Ukrainian and Nigerian.

Consistent with previous years, migrants from Morocco were mostly detected in Spain, using authentic Spanish ID cards to attempt entry to Ceuta or Melilla. Elsewhere, more Moroccans were detected at the Italian than at the Spanish air border, suggesting that Moroccans attempting entry at the air border prefer to target countries where border guards may have less experience in controlling them than Spanish border guards.

Ukrainians were detected in decreasing numbers also using counterfeit stamps attempting entry to Poland and, to a lesser extent, Hungary and Slovakia.

Nigerians have been in the top five for detections of document fraud for several years and in 2012 were slightly more detected than in 2011. The most commonly abused documents by Nigerian nationals were authentic and forged Nigerian passports and counterfeit French visas.

Embarkation points

More than two thirds of all detections on entry at the air border from a third country were of migrants with known places of embarkation. In 2012, Istanbul was used by document fraudsters attempting illegal entry to the EU/Schengen area with the largest overall number of detections, and with Syrians and Iranians being the most common nationalities. The significance of this route is likely to increase in 2013 while the Greek operation Aspida is still active at the Greek land border with Turkey.

Other top embarkation points tended to be most associated with migrants local to each region. For example the second most common embarkation point for document fraudsters in 2012 was Lagos, where Nigerian migrants dominated. Similarly Casablanca, which ranked third, was where most Moroccans embarked and Tunis, which ranked fourth, was mostly used by Tunisians.

Syrian migrants


In 2012, there was a very significant increase in detections of Syrian nationals using document fraud to illegally enter the EU/Schengen area from third countries, from below 100 detections in 2011 to nearly 500 in 2012. Moreover, the number of detections increases to over 1 200 once detections on intra-Schengen flights (~500) and movement between the Schengen area and the UK and are also included. Hence, Syrian migrants represent a significant and increasing risk of document fraud to illegally enter and move within the EU/Schengen area. They were most commonly detected on entry to German airports on flights from Athens and Istanbul.

On entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries, Syrian migrants were most commonly detected with counterfeit Turkish passports and ID cards, and stolen blank German passports. In contrast, while travelling within the Schengen area, counterfeit Greek ID cards and stolen blank Greek residence permits were most frequently detected. Overall there were also many instances of authentic Syrian passports and Bulgarian and Romanian documents. In each case the issuing authority of these documents probably reflected place of embarkation and probably also access to facilitators of the same nationality.

The EDF-ARA 2012 highlighted the increasing trend of document fraud being used by migrants making secondary movements on in-



Figure 14. Since 2009, there have been more refusals of entry at the land border than at the air borders and the gap is widening



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

tra-Schengen flights from Greece, and during the first half of 2012 this was particularly the case for Syrian migrants. However, following the start of the Greek operation Aspida in August 2012, there was a noticeable decline in the number of document fraudsters of all nationalities including Syrians arriving on intra-Schengen flights from Athens. However, if detections on exit from Athens are also taken into account the decline of Syrians was less dramatic. Subsequent to the operation Aspida, all nationalities were detected in much lower frequencies because fewer migrants were entering Greece from Turkey. This decline may also be partly explained by more expensive flights during the summer period, forcing many migrants to make secondary movements via cheaper means than air travel.

Elsewhere in the region, there was a concurrent increase in the number of document fraudsters of many nationalities particularly Syrians arriving in Schengen airports on flights from Istanbul, supporting the theory that many migrants are waiting in Turkey rather than crossing the border into Greece or Bulgaria.

3.6. Refusals of entry

While most refusals of entry are reported from the land and air borders, in line with

the distribution of passenger flows, the long-term trend is an increase at the land border and a decrease at the air borders. These long-term trends are assumed to be linked with increasing passenger flow at the land border, but the lack of detailed data on regular passenger flow does not allow for detailed analysis.

There were large increases in refusals of entry at the Polish land borders with Belarus (due to an increase in refusals of entry issued to Georgians, which peaked in October) and Ukraine. However, these increases were offset by a decrease in refusals of entry issued at other border sections, like at the land border between Greece and Albania, but also decreases reported at some airports, resulting in a stable total at EU level compared to 2011 (115 305, -3%).

In 2012, the sharpest increase was the increase in refusals of entry of Georgian nationals at the Polish border with Belarus, most of it (75%) during the second half of 2012. Between June and December 2012, the number of refusals of entry issued to Georgians at the Polish land border with Belarus was three times as high as between January and June. The vast majority were refused for Reason C No valid visa. This was confirmed by JO Focal Point reports in which the majority of Georgians were refused for not having a valid visa or residence permit (C) or an alert had been issued in the SIS or national database (H).

The phenomenon of increased numbers of refused Georgians is likely to lead to an increase in Georgians illegally staying in other Member States, in particular Sweden and Germany.

Nationalities

Despite increased numbers of Georgians refused entry to Poland, the most common nationality refused entry at a single border section was Ukrainian nationals refused

entry at their land border with Poland. Ukrainians, who ranked first for refusals of entry at EU level, were refused entry to Poland for a variety of reasons, particularly Reason C No valid visa, and Reason E No justification.

The majority of Albanians continued to be refused at the BCP Kakavia, one of the main border-crossing points at the Greek–Albanian border. The main reported reasons for refusal of entry were an alert issued in the SIS or national database (H), false travel document (B) or not having appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay (E).


At the air borders, Brazilians still rank first for refusals of entry, but on a decreasing trend with less than 3 000 refusals of entry in 2012, compared to more than 10 000 in 2008. The same decreasing trend is observed for other Latin American nationalities, all of them sharply decreasing between 2011 and 2012, like nationals from Venezuela (836, -37%), Paraguay (595, -55%).

In the UK, US nationals represent a large proportion of refusals of entry but they are not linked to irregular migration. Indeed, US passengers represent far more arrivals than other passengers, and the refusals of entry issued to them are mostly technical and not assessed by the UK authorities as a threat of irregular migration to the EU. This shows the importance of analysing refusals of entry against passenger flows, as otherwise the conclusions can be misleading.

3.7. Detections of illegal stay

In 2012, there were 344 928 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which represents a generally stable trend compared to the year before and recent reporting periods. This is consistent with a stable but slightly declining long-term trend over the past five years (Fig. 16).

Figure 15. Ukrainians were the most common nationality refused entry in 2012 followed by Albanians



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

In 2008, there were 441 237 detections of illegal stay, or 28% more than in 2012.


In the following analysis of detections of illegal stay it has to be borne in mind that in 2012 the Netherlands, for technical reasons, only reported detections on exit and not detections made inland, which in 2011 amounted to about 6 000. Also in Sweden many asylum applicants were also reported as illegal stayers, raising the total number of detections of illegal stay in Sweden.

While the number of detections of illegal stay declined in many Member States, it increased or remained unchanged in some. There are multiple reasons for these developments, including indirect ones such as visa liberalisation and the economic crisis in the EU. Also crucial in explaining the long-term decline are factors such as effective legislation, policies and their implementation in the form of practical measures.

The declines since 2008, in terms of volume and trends, have been the strongest in Spain (-53%), France (-61%), Italy (-52%) and Portugal



Figure 16. Since 2008, detections of illegal stay have shown a long-term decline, due to a combination of factors including visa liberalisation and the economic crisis in the EU




Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

(-67%). In contrast, Germany reported considerable increases between 2008 and 2012 (+62%). Consequently, it ranked first for detections of illegal stay.

The vast majority of illegal stayers were detected inland (278 438 detections, or 81% of the total) and so are presumed to be long-

term overstayers as they were making no attempt to leave at the time of detection. The next most common location for detections of illegal stayers was those exiting at the air (35 410 detections or 10% of the total) followed by the land borders (19 883 detections, or 5%) whereby illegally staying migrants were leaving the EU or the Schengen area.

Figure 17. Among nationalities detected for staying illegally, Syrians, Pakistanis and Albanians increased the most between 2011 and 2012



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

Nationalities

The long-term trend also varies according to nationalities. Although Afghans, Moroccans and Algerians have been among the top five since 2008, Pakistanis, ranking third in 2012, only appeared in the top ten after 2010. Detections of Tunisians considerably increased after the Arab Spring, and in 2012, were still above 15 000 detections.

Marriage of convenience

According to the EMN Focused Study on the Misuse of the Right to Family Reunification released in June 2012, whilst the perception among policy makers, and the media in particular, indicates that misuse of the right to family reunification through marriages of convenience or false declarations of parent-

hood may be a widespread phenomenon, the evidence suggests that, while marriages of convenience do occur, it is not yet possible to fully quantify it across all Member States in a comparable manner. Where misuse has been detected, this seems to be primarily for marriages of convenience rather than false declarations of parenthood.

Member States face many challenges when distinguishing a marriage of convenience from a genuine marriage. Not only is this a sensitive matter in terms of respecting fundamental rights, and Member States are fully committed to their obligations in this respect, but such investigations tend to be very time-consuming and resource-intensive with the burden of proof most often placed on the Member State authorities.

Students

Overall, at EU level, the extent of the abuse of student visa is unknown. Gauging from the responses by Member States, the phenomenon seem to vary widely among Member States. The UK made changes to Tier 4 (student tier) of their Points-Based System to tackle abuse, including by increasing the level of English language proficiency and imposing additional requirements on educational institutions. In contrast, twelve Member States took steps in simplifying procedures for students to enter and stay on their territory as this is seen as a way to import skilled and educated foreigners.

3.8. Asylum applications

In 2012, there were more applications for asylum in the EU since FRAN data collection began in early 2008 (note that data for France and the Netherlands only include applications made at the border). The number of claims increased from 2011 to 2012 to reach 272 208 applications. Germany ranked first with a quarter of all asylum applications in the EU.

Both the number of claims and the number of applicants increased by 7% between 2011 and 2012.

Considering the total of applications, while Afghans still rank first, the most significant trend was the increased applications submitted by Syrian nationals, which in 2012 increased to nearly 22 424 applications, compared to 8 180 applications in 2011. This represented the most major influx of asylum seekers for many years. Of these asylum seekers two-thirds were reported by Sweden and Germany.

Nevertheless, regarding the total of applicants, more than 32 000 asylum seekers from Western Balkans (visa-exempt nationalities) applied in the EU in 2012. Then Afghans with 27 630 applicants (-13% in comparison with 2011, 29 672) and Syrians, 22 424 applicants (+172% in comparison with 2011, 8 180).

Syrian migrants have been reported to arrive from Istanbul with Swedish genuine passports used as impostors, as well as some forged EU passports and forged or stolen blank Greek residence permits. However, many Syrians also arrived from Istanbul with Turkish Airlines in possession of genuine Syrian passports without any visas or permits.

The number of Russian applications also increased between 2011 and 2012, due to increases reported by Poland; 16 350 applicants (+26% in comparison with 2011, 12 936). Most of the applications of Russian nationals in Poland are believed to be connected with Russians of Chechen origins.

Since Frontex started to develop the Post Visa-Liberalisation Monitoring Mechanism (PVLMM) for the European Commission in 2011, following the introduction of a visa-free regime for Western Balkan countries (Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro) in



2012, the number of asylum applications of Western Balkan nationals in 2012 was the largest recorded. In 2012, a total of 32 886 asylum applications were filed in the EU by the Western Balkan visa-exempt nationalities. This represents an increase of 53% compared to 2011.

Most asylum seekers from the Western Balkans continue to travel to the EU overland, using regular bus connections. By and large, entry into the EU occurs at the Hungarian-Serbian or Slovenian-Croatian border.

Given the growing trend of the phenomenon in the past two years, there are now discussions in the EU regarding the possible reintroduction of the visa regime. Frontex Post Visa-Liberalisation Monitoring Mechanism is an essential instrument supporting these discussions.

3.9. Returns

Return decisions issued

In 2012, there were 269 949 third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial decision, which was a 17% increase compared to 2011. However, much of this change was due to new definitions applied to this indicator by Italy in early 2012. Not considering data from Italy, the annual increase was of 2%. Nevertheless, the absolute total number of migrants subject to return decisions is still underestimated by this indicator, as data on decisions were unavailable from France, the Netherlands and Sweden, which countries only reported effective returns and where it is assumed that high numbers of decisions were issued.

Slightly more than half of the total reported decisions at EU level were issued in just three Member States: Greece, the UK and Italy. In Greece, most decisions were taken for Paki-

stanis and Afghans. These decisions amount to large numbers of requests to leave the country within 30 days, most of which are routinely ignored by migrants who instead continue with their secondary movements to other Member States. In the UK, most return decisions were taken for Indians and Pakistani, whereas in Belgium they were mostly taken for North Africans (Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians).

Effective returns

In 2012, there was a steady trend of 159 490 third-country nationals effectively returned to outside the EU. The UK was the Member State conducting the largest number of returns, with steady trends of returned nationals from India and Pakistan. Although from lower bases, some of the biggest increases at the EU level compared to the year before included Serbian nationals (from 4 948 to 7 494, +51%).

Type of return

It is difficult to evaluate the overall cost-effectiveness of return measures against other practical measures taken to reduce irregular migration. However, forced returns are recognised as being more costly than voluntary return, although Member States highlight the importance of return flights (including those co-ordinated by Frontex) in ensuring effective return, as well as in acting as a deterrent effect for future irregular migrants.*

Within the number of effective returns to third countries, about half were reported to be on voluntary basis and half were forced return. The UK and Poland reported the largest number of voluntary return, and Greece, the UK and France accounted for nearly half of the forced return. Most of the forced return concerned Albanians returned by Greece, followed by Pakistanis.

* European Migration Network Synthesis Report, *Practical Measures to Reduce Irregular Migration*, 2012


Since 2010 in Norway, most people who applied for assisted voluntary return have been offered graded reintegration support. The amount offered in support is up to NOK 20 000 (EUR 2 700). The only condition is that people apply for voluntary return before the deadline that has been set for leaving Norway. Since 19 July 2012, families who have been refused asylum in Norway are offered NOK 10 000 (EUR 1 350) per child in addition to the NOK 20 000 per adult if they return voluntarily to their country of origin. This support is meant to encourage families who have been illegal in Norway for many years to apply for voluntary return.

The Norwegian authorities have closely monitored the system in order to detect possible misuse and to monitor the possible pull-factor effect. Earlier this year, Norway experienced a sudden increase in the number of asylum seekers from Belarus. Many applied for assisted voluntary return suspiciously shortly after they were registered as asylum seekers.

In March, it was decided that IOM returnees from Belarus were no longer entitled to receive subsistence allowance or reintegration grant. Since June, Georgians have also been temporarily excluded from the financial support scheme.

In Greece, several measures taken by the Greek authorities to counter irregular migration (Xenios Zeus and Aspida), the continuously worsening labour demand prompted many to opt for voluntary return. In 2012, a total of 6 324 people — most of whom were from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Iraq, — left Greece with the IOM program, and a further 800 were repatriated by a scheme funded by Norway. Among them, about 360 took part in resettlement programmes that included special assistance for opening businesses, or training, which

Figure 18. **Forced returns are recognised as being more costly than voluntary return, but also perceived as a stronger deterrent for future irregular migrants. In 2012, about half the returns were voluntary**



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

were provided as an incentive to help them stay in their country.

3.10. Other illegal activities

This section is an overview of cross-border crime affecting the work of border guards at the external borders of the EU. The analysis is structured around the following issues: smuggling of illicit drugs, trafficking in human beings, terrorist threats, smuggling of weapons, stolen vehicles (on exit), smuggling of excise goods (cigarettes and oil products).

3.10.1. Smuggling of illicit drugs

Seizures in 2012 demonstrate a continued demand for conventional drugs in the EU, but they also show a trend towards an increasingly diversified market of new, mainly synthetic drugs. This development poses additional challenges to authorities along the EU external borders, particularly requiring improved training and means of identification.



Western Balkan route

Around 85% of the globally consumed heroin is produced from Afghan opium. Large parts of this substance are trafficked through Iran, Turkey, and South East Europe towards Central and Western Europe, along the so-called Western Balkan route. Europol reports that large quantities of heroin continue to be imported via Turkey using freight or passenger vehicles, and Turkish OCGs have established themselves in key EU countries to maintain control further down the supply chain. In 2012, border guards together with custom officers detected a total amount of 86 kg of heroin through Frontex Joint Operations in Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, and Slovenia. Most seizures were related to single travellers who concealed smaller amounts on their bodies or in cavities of their cars. Other detections, however, showed the reappearance of larger scale heroin shipments along the Balkan route – a phenomenon that seemed to decrease during 2011. On 9 August, 21.8 kg of heroin were found in the tank of a Bosnian lorry during JO Focal Point Land. In November, Frontex border guards searched the car of a Bulgarian citizen and found 10.8 kg of heroin packed in 21 bags under the rear seats of the vehicle.

In its largest single heroin seizure ever, the Austrian customs authority detected 130 kg of heroin packed in 230 parcels that were hidden in hollow cavities of a Bulgarian cooling van. Only an x-ray device for lorries and test drillings were able to confirm the initial suspicion of the participating officers. The perpetrators smuggled the load along the Balkan route into Bulgaria and planned to transport it to one of the Benelux countries.* Also Greece is a major entry door for heroin to the EU.

Although future developments are hard to predict, a decrease in seizures, availability and market prices show that the heroin prob-



© Polish Border Guard

Figure 19. **Intensive cooperation between Polish border guard and customs officers for the detection of smuggled tobacco products from the Russian Federation**

lem is currently subsiding. However, studies claim that heroin is likely to be replaced by other substances such as synthetic opioids, methamphetamine, cathinones and benzodiazepines. UNODC also estimates that due to the existing a customs union between the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus, the deliveries of opiate products to Europe will see a displacement from the Balkan route to the Northern route, which leads through Central Asia.**

Heroin is not the only illicit substance systematically smuggled along the Balkan route. In 2012, 657 kg of Marijuana was seized through Frontex Joint Operations at the borders to Croatia, Albania, Serbia and Turkey. The largest related shipment was detected in October 2012 at the Hungarian BCP Kelebia, when a citizen of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia attempted to smuggle 492 kg of Marijuana concealed under a double wall of his empty van. Cannabis from Albania to mainly Greece, Italy, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is reported again in large amounts, after Albanian law enforcement managed to destroy production capacities in many rural areas. While in 2011, around 3.7 tonnes of cannabis herb have been seized by Albanian authorities, the number more than doubled in 2012.

** UNODC, *Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia*, 2012

* <http://www.bmf.gv.at/Presse/Pressearchiv2012/Jaenner/12747.htm>

The Bulgarian BCP Kapitan Andreevo to Turkey is a particularly vulnerable border-crossing point along the Balkan route with a very large amount of regular traffic. Law-enforcement activities at Kapitan Andreevo regained momentum in May 2012, after Bulgarian anti-organised crime police uncovered and disrupted a corruption scheme involving dozens of customs officers. Frontex JO Focal Points Land assisted in revealing numerous attempts of drug contraband at this BCP. In one case, Frontex officers detected 33 kg of heroin in the tank of a van driven by a Serbian citizen, who intended to transport the illicit load from Turkey to Serbia.

Western Mediterranean route

The Western Mediterranean route is extensively utilised for the smuggling of cannabis products from Morocco. Moreover, organised crime groups smuggle cocaine from Latin America through West Africa, subsequently using boats and airplanes on their way towards Europe. Europol reports that the Iberian Peninsula, in particular Spain, is considered to be the main entry point for cocaine arriving in Europe.

Most of the cannabis resin consumed in Europe has traditionally been produced in Morocco and smuggled through Spain into the EU. Simultaneously, the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Joint Report 2012 assumes that a growing amount of cannabis from West Africa is smuggled out of the region and may reach Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. Additionally, Afghanistan's growing cannabis production and indoor cultivation within the EU is increasingly challenging Morocco's dominance as a supplier.*

Like in 2011, JO Minerva 2012 has been particularly successful in revealing these illicit shipments. The operational areas of this operation were the maritime border-crossing

points at the ferry ports of Algeciras, Tarifa and Ceuta of Spain. The number of drug detections during this operation rose by 6.6% to 209, thereby confiscating almost 5 tonnes of hashish and 35 kg of Cocaine. 260 persons were involved in the smuggling attempts, 61% of the perpetrators were of Moroccan and 26% of Spanish nationality. In many cases, the smugglers attached the drugs to their bodies, swallowed them, or hid them in hollow cavities of their cars and lorries.



© Cuerpo Nacional de Policía

The Spanish National Police seized more than 11 tonnes of hashish hidden in fuel tanks

In December, Spanish authorities disbanded a criminal organisation that controlled the entire trafficking chain from production to packaging, transport from Morocco to Spain, storage, and the redistribution across Europe – mainly to France, Belgium, the UK and the Netherlands. The group conducted periodic drug shipments on trucks using ferries into the EU, whereby the marijuana was hidden in double floors of truck fuel tanks. National Police agents have seized more than 11 tonnes of hashish and arrested 35 people in what has been one of the biggest operations against the trafficking of hashish in the interior of the Iberian peninsula.

* UNODC, *World Drug Report*, 2012



The amount of hashish seized during JO EPN Indalo increased by 147% between 2011 and 2012. This operation took place along the Spanish coast between Granada and Malaga and led to the arrest of 84 persons who attempted to ship 30 tonnes of hashish into the EU. In many cases smugglers used rubber boats or fast jet skis to reach the Spanish coast. The operation revealed that the facilitation of irregular migration and the smuggling of drugs from Morocco are geographically and organisationally separated. For the second year in a row the JO EPN Indalo has been used as platform for EU inter-agency cooperation between Frontex, CeCLAD-M, EFCA and Europol. At least five drug-related incidents were reported during JO Hera, which took place between July and December between the Canary Islands and Morocco. The operation led to the confiscation of 3 146 kg of hashish and the arrest of 13 smugglers.

Cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe yields higher profits than to the United States and remains therefore strong. This trend was exemplified by a shipment of 3.2 tonnes of cocaine aboard the Bulgarian vessel Sveti Nikolay, which Spanish law-enforcement authorities intercepted around 80 km off Cadiz on its way to Galicia in north-western Spain. 21 Bulgarian and 6 Colombian citizens were arrested in connection with the shipment. Cocaine trafficking towards the EU is strongly diversified, whereas Spain is a main entry point and distribution centre for cocaine from Latin America. According to Europol, large amounts of cocaine are furthermore dispatched from Latin America through container vessels to the European ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam.

Criminal groups extensively smuggle Latin American cocaine to Europe via West Africa, with Guinea Bissau and Ghana playing major roles as hubs.* From West Africa, the illicit load may transit along the coast and



© Frontex/JO EPN Indalo

Figure 20. **Smugglers operating between Spain and Morocco drop their illicit load after being detected by border guards**

through the Maghreb towards Europe, or is taken by couriers on commercial flights to European airports.

Drugs smuggled across the Mediterranean Sea to enter the EU from the Balkans

Incidents in 2012 showed drug shipments that were trafficked across the Mediterranean Sea with the purpose to enter the EU through Bulgaria. In July 2012, Bulgarian law-enforcement authorities seized 12 tonnes of hashish worth around EUR 360 million in a warehouse in the village of Mirovyane near Sofia. National authorities claimed that the cannabis was brought from Morocco, unloaded in the Black Sea and transported to the mainland by fishermen. The amount seized exceeded the detection of 4 tonnes of hashish destined for Belgium on a Danube ferry near Vidin few days before. The two cases were claimed to be connected. The Black Sea Borders are currently not covered by any Frontex Joint Operation.

In May 2012, Bulgarian customs officers found 67 kg of cocaine hidden in a combine harvester that was transported on successive ships from Argentina to the Black Sea city of Varna and from there to the Danube city of Ruse. The destination for the illicit substance was planned to be the Netherlands.

* UNODC, *Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa*, 2012



© JO EPN Indalo 2012

Figure 21. **Inflatable boat smuggling hashish from Morocco to Spain**

According to Europol, substantial seizures of cocaine, mostly in containers, have been made in Black Sea ports and in the Balkans, suggesting the development of these regions to important entry points for cocaine. Cocaine is also increasingly directed towards Croatian ports.

New synthetic drugs and their precursors smuggled on different routes mainly from Asia

The success of future anti-drug strategies will increasingly depend on the capacities to effectively identify a wide range of substances. The EU Early Warning System reports the detection of around one new toxic stimulant per week, with a clearly rising tendency. All new drugs notified between January and September 2012 have been synthetic, with the largest groups being the synthetic cathinones (e.g. mephedrone, MDPV), which show similar effects as cocaine, and the synthetic cannabinoids.* Most of the synthetic cathinones are produced in China, India, Pakistan and other Asian countries, whereas amphetamine-type stimulants are manufactured in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Republic of Korea and Thailand.**

In some cases, the traditional flow of illicit drugs into the EU may be reversed by in-

creased production of new 'designer drugs' in Central European countries, as well as of ecstasy and amphetamines in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Poland. Also in the Czech Republic, the police-led disruption of 400 methamphetamine labs in 2012 revealed a clear export orientation of the illicit business.

Moreover, the number of products containing multiple psychoactive substances is on the rise, as also in the case of many 'Legal Highs', which are produced through chemical precursors mainly coming from China. The term is insofar misleading, as many of these drugs contain both controlled and uncontrolled substances. 'Legal highs' are popular among young consumers, as they are easily available through retail outlets and a rising number of internet stores. The impact of these drugs on the health of their consumers is enormous: 43 people died in the UK after taking licit methcathinones in 2010, compared to 5 deaths in 2009.

As the example of Hungary shows, the new trend towards 'legal highs' and a diversification of synthetic drugs significantly changed the characteristics of the drug supply lines. Many new substances are produced domestically. While many of their online stores serve an international market, the precursors for the new synthetic drugs are ordered from China.***

3.10.2. Trafficking in human beings

In June, the European Commission adopted a new strategy for the years 2012–2016 for the eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings. It announces key priorities in the fight against that crime, including the identification of victims, preventive measures, an increased prosecution of the perpetrators, enhanced coordination and cooperation among key actors, and the raising of public awareness. According to Europol, however, a large obstacle in the combat

*** EMCDDA, *National Report Hungary*, 2011

* EMCDDA, *Drugnet Europe newsletter*, Issue 80, 2012.

** UNODC, *Global Smart Update*, Volume 8, 2012



Figure 22. **A Polish Border Guard officer examining 850 grammes of amphetamine at the border to Belarus**

against trafficking in human beings is the lack of harmonised and sufficient data on the phenomenon, which leads to a significant intelligence gap. Assessments of national, international, and non-governmental organisations are frequently based on incomplete data and estimates. In its Communication on measuring crime in the EU, the European Commission therefore adopted an Action Plan for 2011–2015 to collect comparable and reliable data, based on a small number of indicators.*

The detection of persons trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation or forced labour represents a major challenge for border authorities. Victims have to be identified as such although many of themselves not aware about their fate when they arrive in a transit or destination country. 2012 saw the further development of new ways to prevent human trafficking. The key for a better recognition is the delivery of advance information to border guards, which would substantially supplement the few seconds they normally possess for the identification of a potential victim among countless other passengers. Some airlines in the UK started to train cabin crews to identify potential perpetrators and victims of human trafficking already aboard the aircraft. A hotline has been established to communicate potential cases

to border guards before planes arrive in the UK. A similar cooperation between the globalised travel industry and national border authorities on a European level could exponentially increase its outreach.

Research and law enforcement revelations related to human trafficking showed various nuances of the phenomenon lately. Interviews with Nigerian victims in the UK conducted by the Institute for Public Policy Research suggest that most victims did not actively decide to take employment in the UK for an expectedly better life, but were compelled to leave their country by a parent or close family member. The study also refutes the idea that Nigerian human trafficking is run by organised crime groups involved in drug smuggling and other crimes. Most of the trafficking was indeed informally arranged by the closest environment or the family of the victims.

In contrast, other Member States highlight the systematic division of work and high organisational level reached by Nigerian nationals involved in the trafficking of human beings, who operate nationally and across borders, applying a combination of modern managerial skills, traditional cultural values and religious beliefs. In these cases, Nigerian criminal networks conducting this crime should be seen as an aggregation of criminal groups with different tasks and specialisations, including the recruitment of the victims, the counterfeiting of documents, the transportation to the country of destination, the exploitation of the victims and the laundering of profits. Some of these functional elements are also connected to other criminal activities. Migrants crossing the border illegally near the coast of Sicily, Calabria and Puglia, for example, are turned into trafficking victims by seizing their passport and forcing them to settle their fictive 'debt' through sexual or labour exploitation.

* European Commission, *The EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012–2016*, COM(2012) 286 final, 2012

Some disruptions of Chinese criminal organisations involved in large-scale human trafficking activities, money laundering, and the smuggling of drugs and counterfeit products were reported in Spain and Italy.

The recently published UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Human Beings 2012 described a particularly unsettling trend. According to its data collection and analysis, carried out in cooperation with national authorities, the number of trafficked children slightly increased in Europe, accounting for around 16% the total during the reporting period. Many of these children were forced to beg or commit petty crimes, others were trafficked for forced marriages, or forced participation in pornography. A frequent *modus operandi* related to trafficking of children has been seen by JO Indalo, when 'anchor children' were accompanied by Nigerian women on their way to Spain, who claimed to be their mothers. The parenthood, however, could be excluded by DNA test. The objective was to be granted with legal documentation that would allow free movement within the EU and to sponsor 'family reunification' with a 'father' still abroad. The women were forced into prostitution upon arrival in Spain, whereas a male migrant waiting in Morocco would claim to be the father and therefore be granted with the legal documents to follow.

While trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation is globally on the rise, this purpose accounted for about 29% of all victims in Western and Central Europe, which is below the international average. The stagnant European economy that followed the financial crisis boosted a low-cost labour market for mainly seasonal agricultural employment, which shows visible elements of coercion and deception. The International Labour Organisation estimates that 1.5 million people are victims of forced labour in the developed economies, including cases resulting from prior trafficking. In 2007, the calculated opportu-

nity costs of coercion in terms of lost earnings amounted to an estimated EUR 1.5 billion in the developed economies and EUR 15 billion globally.*

3.10.3. Terrorism

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the August 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot in the UK and the 2009 Christmas Day Bombing attempt gradually shifted aviation-related security measures towards more stringency and comprehensiveness, but at the same time complicated the life of bona fide passengers and increased expenses for travel operators. A future strategy to further enhance security measures on commercial flights will have to emphasise on advance risk assessments and both the inter-agency and international exchange of information.

In 2012, the main EU decision-making bodies were negotiating a Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. The aim of the directive would be to set up an EU system for the collection and use of PNR data, covering all flights across EU external borders. It would include information related to names, the date and the itinerary of the flight, and the means of payment used, among other things. Air carriers would transfer the data before departure of the flight to the law-enforcement authorities of the Member State it operates the flight from or to. The system allows border authorities to analyse the data and to compare it with existing files, as for example related to terrorism. The data would be kept for 30 days, after which Member States would need to make it anonymous.

Recent cases show that efficient analytical capabilities in the identification of false documents are an essential tool of border author-

* ILO, *Forced Labour: The Cost of Coercion*, 2009



ities for the prevention of terrorist attacks. The person that committed a suicide attack at the US embassy in Ankara on 1 February 2013 had crossed the EU external border from the Greek islands to Turkey with a false ID card.

3.10.4. Smuggling of small weapons

The rather sporadic information received through Frontex Joint Operations and Member State authorities on trafficking in small arms across the EU external borders does not give a comprehensive picture on the overall situation and leave a substantial knowledge gap. However, individual incidents suggest certain geographically related threats and vulnerabilities.

During JO Focal Points Land 2012, small fire arms, ammunition, and gun powder have been seized in 10 incidents, most of them at the borders to Croatia and Serbia.

Analysts from the Member States expect a continued flow of illicit small arms from the Western Balkan countries, where a large number of weapons are stored in private households. The influx of weapons from the Western Balkans to Central and Western Europe may increase after the expected EU accession of Croatia and the shifting of the EU customs border to the long and mountainous area between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3.10.5. Stolen vehicles

According to Europol, the main destinations for stolen vehicles are: the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Belarus, Ukraine, Pakistan and North Africa. This strongly influences the main routes for stolen vehicles and the composition of the OCGs, mostly made up of nationals from these regions.

The most concerned border section for the export of stolen vehicles in 2012 was between

Poland and Ukraine. In the course of JO Focal Points Land, 197 stolen cars, vans, lorries, trailers and motorbikes were identified e.g. through their vehicle identification numbers (VIN), with Volkswagen and Mercedes being the most popular brands.

The second most important destination region for cars and other machinery stolen from mostly Germany, France and Italy were the Western Balkan countries. In the context of JO Focal Points Land, 83 cars were detected along the Slovenian-Croatian border. The export of 49 stolen vehicles was prevented at the border between Hungary and Serbia. The most popular targets for vehicle thefts destined for the Western Balkan countries were Volkswagen, BMW, and Audi.

A development away from the theft of luxury models towards a preference for cars of the medium and lower classes can be also seen in France, where in 2012 compact cars were among the models that were most stolen and frequently disassembled into spare parts. The prevalence for average-looking vehicles with standard colours definitely complicate the risk profiling efforts of border authorities.

JO Focal Points Land reported 41 stolen cars, lorries and motorbikes identified upon their attempted exit from Bulgaria and Greece to Turkey. Car thieves on the way to Turkey had exceptional preferences with an emphasis on luxury and sports cars, including the brands BMW (15) and Mercedes (8), Porsche (3), and Lamborghini (2). While most of the drivers were EU nationals or Turkish citizens, some were from countries as far away as Iran, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.

Another frequent destination of cars stolen in EU countries was Northern Africa: Frontex officers in cooperation with national authorities detected 42 stolen vehicles on their way to Morocco, of which 12 were identified at BCP Algeciras. Almost 1.2 million cars




Figure 23. **The main routes for stolen vehicles across the EU borders in 2012 based on information on stolen vehicles' country of origin and place of detection collected during JO Focal Points**

pass through the port of Algeciras annually, arriving from or departing to Ceuta (Spanish enclave in Morocco) and Tangier (Morocco), and around 100 ships go in or out of the harbour daily.

In five cases between July and August 2012, officers deployed through JO EPN Minerva 2012 identified vehicles and a motorbike engine arriving from Morocco at the Spanish BCPs of Algeciras, Ceuta, and Tarifa. The me-

dium-class vehicles of various brands were previously reported as stolen in France, Italy and Spain.

3.10.6. Smuggling of excise goods

The smuggling of tobacco is a lucrative illegal activity due to increasing price differentials between Member States of the EU and countries neighbouring its external borders. The contraband of cigarettes across the EU



© Polish Border Guard

Figure 24. **Cigarettes smuggled in a train transporting rape seed from Belarus**

external borders flourished in 2012 in face of rising excise taxes on tobacco in many EU countries. In general, cigarette smuggling is perceived as a low risk business, since in many countries it is treated as a misdemeanour – compared to the tough criminal sanctions imposed on drug traffickers.

On a daily basis, cigarettes are smuggled on a small scale – by travellers or migrant workers returning home to the EU, or by persons residing in the border regions. Criminal organisations make use of both ‘ant techniques’ and large-scale operations including hundreds of thousands of cigarettes. In 2012, most detections of contraband cigarettes were made along the borders to the Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Turkey.

In July, the cheapest pack of 20 cigarettes cost 41 cents in the Russian Federation, while Lithuanian citizens paid an amount five times and Finnish citizens ten times as high. Specifically, the situation around the Kaliningrad region was made worse by the fact that several cigarette factories within the exclave solely produce for export purposes. The difficult economic situation in Kaliningrad and its neighbouring countries shapes an environment that additionally encourages cigarette smuggling.



© Polish Border Guard

Figure 25. **Smuggling of 800 litres of petrol products detected at the Polish-Ukrainian border in December 2012**

The largest smuggling operation that was uncovered in 2012 revealed a tunnel built between Uzhgorod in Ukraine and Vysne Nemecke in Slovakia. The smugglers used advanced mining technology to build the 700 metres long construction and equipped it with its own narrow-gauge train.

A very frequent *modus operandi* detected during JO Focal Points Land was to leave unattended amounts of tobacco in trains, from where they are picked up upon arrival at their destination. Larger amounts of cigarettes have been hidden in hollow cavities of cars and double walls or floors of lorries. In several cases, cigarettes were smuggled across the river Uh, which originates in Ukraine and for a short section draws the border with Slovakia.

While cigarettes were increasingly smuggled from Morocco to Spain and detected through JO Minerva and Indalo, also the Eastern Mediterranean showed to be an emerging hub for trafficked tobacco. One of the largest detections made in the context a Frontex Joint Operation consisted in the detection of around 53 760 000 Egyptian-produced cigarettes on the vessel ‘Noah’ under Moldovan flag. The ship attracted the attention of the authorities in December 2012 close to Chania on the Greek island of Crete.

Trafficking of petroleum products is mainly reported at the eastern European borders with the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine, as well as with the Balkan countries. Petrol price differentials between Member States and third countries made the smug-

gling of petrol a profitable enterprise along these border sections. Anecdotal evidence suggests that petrol smuggling occurs frequently and often involves individual smugglers transporting smaller quantities for their own consumption or sale to acquaintances.



4. Environmental scan

Economic situation in Europe remains difficult

The EU continues to deal with a difficult economic crisis, which bears heavily on labour demand and employment performance in the EU. The differences between Member States in economic activity and labour market dynamics have increased significantly throughout 2012. According to the European Commission, the already high unemployment rate is likely to rise further in 2013, both in the EU and the Euro area. More importantly, the situation in more vulnerable Member States will progressively affect the remainder of the EU.

The EU economy is expected to grow at a subdued rate of 0.5% in 2013. However, the European Commission warns that this outlook is still marked by high uncertainty and subject to substantial downside risks.

Home Affairs in the next MFF

According to the European Commission's proposal, the number of funds in home affairs during the new Multi-annual Financial Framework (period 2014–2020) will be reduced from the current four to only two: the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF). While the number of the funds will be smaller, the available funding should increase by almost 40% compared to the total budget for the previous period 2007–2013.

Both funds will have an external dimension ensuring continuity of financing, starting in the EU and continuing in third countries. There will also be a common regulatory framework for both funds.

The new arrangement should allow for a better management, either shared or centralised, of available resources. Member States will be entitled to basic amounts and could

Figure 26. Proposed structure for financing Home Affairs in the period between 2014–2020



Source: European Commission, FRAN meeting in Cyprus, December 2012



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be eligible for variable amounts based on the results of mid-term review and risk assessment (*inter alia*) from Frontex.

Implementation of Visa Information System (VIS)

The first phase of VIS implementation started already in October 2011 when consulates of all Member States (excluding the UK and Ireland) and Schengen Associated Countries in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia began inserting biometric data of visa applicants into the VIS. Sweden was the first Member State with a registered transaction while Germany was the first to issue a visa with fingerprints.

By the end of 2011, the VIS had successfully processed almost 300 000 visa applications, of which roughly 33 500 visas were refused. A large majority of all fingerprints were submitted by only four Member States: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The new system already detect almost 500 cases when the same person applied in more than one consular post (potential visa shopping).

By the end of 2012, the VIS was extended to cover two additional regions; the Middle East and the Gulf (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen). The current plan is to extend the use of VIS to cover the whole globe by the end of 2013.

The VIS should be considered as integral part of a future EU systems that will use advanced technology to strengthen controls and capac-

ity to monitor entries to the EU. Under current plans it will be joined in coming years by an Entry-Exit System (EES) and Registered Traveller Programme as part of the 'smart borders package'.

Schengen Information System II (SIS II) goes live in 2013

SIS II will have a number of new features compared to the current Schengen Information System. These include the insertion of biometric data into the system; interlinking of alerts on people and/or objects; and possible interoperability with other databases such as the Visa Information System (VIS).

Following the testing of the national and central systems' components, the focus of activity in the first half of 2012 was on intensive testing of the central system and its increasing interaction with the national systems. The preparations for the final stages of the project, namely the actual migration of SIS I data, also advanced considerably during 2012.

According to the European Commission, all challenges encountered during these final testing phases of the project were addressed successfully, thanks to the over-riding cooperative approach between Member States and the European Commission, allowing the SIS II project to go live in the first quarter of 2013.

SIS II will allow end users to have access to the extended functionality of SIS II – access to copies of the European Arrest Warrant, links between alerts, new categories of alert, access to fingerprints and photographs of the subjects of alerts, enhanced



* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

** European Migration Network Synthesis Report, *Visa Policy as Migration Channel*, 2012

protection for the victims of misused identity, better opportunities for use of discreet check and specific check alerts due to clearer wording of the legal base, the opportunity to request seizure of property that is required as evidence (as opposed to being simply lost or stolen).

Member States' national D-type visa policies show significant variation

An in-depth study** of Member States' use of long-stay (D-type) visas as a tool to manage migration, both in terms of facilitating legal migration and preventing irregular migration, revealed that a 'mosaic of visa and residence permit requirements exists in several Member States'.

Member States differ regarding:

- The range of migratory purposes for which visas are issued (e.g. migration for study, employment, family reunification or humanitarian purposes);
- The target groups (e.g. third-country origin, skills level, etc.) to which visas are issued;
- The 'function of the visa' in terms of managing migration (e.g. visa as a travel/entry permit; visa as a temporary residence title, before a permanent one is granted in the Member State);
- The validity of the visas; and
- The procedures for applying, examining, extending, and withdrawing these visas.

The study also showed that in only three Member States (France, Slovenia and the UK) there is a strong link between national visa policy and migration management. Visa policy and practice of these Member States are fully supporting respective national migration strategies.

Road map for visa liberalisation with Kosovo*

Kosovo remains the only region in the Western Balkans that is excluded from the visa-free travel arrangements. At the end of 2011, the Council reaffirmed that Kosovo would benefit from the perspective of eventual visa liberalisation once all conditions are met and without prejudice to Member States' position on status.

Against this background, and taking into account the Council's requirements expressed in various Council conclusions, as well as the result of numerous expert missions and meetings, the European Commission launched visa dialogue with Kosovo during January 2012.

The road map for visa liberalisation with Kosovo was presented by the European Commission in June 2012. In this framework, Kosovo was requested first to adopt or amend the legislation in line with the EU *acquis* and as set out in the road map. Kosovo is also expected to fully implement the new legislation and all other measures specified in the road map document.

EU-Russian Federation visa liberalisation Common Steps

During 2012, the visa dialogue between the EU and the Russian Federation entered into implementation phase of the Common Steps which were agreed at the end of 2011. Field missions were implemented both by the EU and the Russian Federation. While the timetable leading to actual negotiations and to possible visa liberalisation is not known, a preliminary analysis on the impact shows that visa liberalisation would be a major institutional change at the eastern land borders of the EU.

The operational environment would change significantly with the expected strong

growth of traffic at the EU-Russian Federation land borders. There is a lot of potential in foreign travel in the Russian Federation in general with large population base near the border.

The growth of traffic in recent years at the Finnish-Russian land border (12 million in 2012, over +60% since 2009), partly due to use of the visa facilitation agreement, as well as recent figures from the Polish-Russian land border (+71.6% in 2012) suggest that the potential for the growth of traffic in the conditions of visa liberalisation is very large.

Possible use of EURODAC data for law-enforcement purposes

The European Commission's proposal to recast the EURODAC Regulation will not change the fundamental way in which EURODAC operates for the purpose of comparing the fingerprints of asylum seekers and certain other categories of migrants in order to facilitate the Dublin Regulation. The recast includes an extension to the scope of the Regulation in order to allow law-enforcement authorities in Member States as well as Europol to compare latent fingerprints from crime scenes with EURODAC fingerprint data for the purpose of preventing, detecting and investigating serious crimes and terrorism.

The Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU-LISA) was established as anticipated and took up its responsibilities on 1 December 2012. The hand-over of the operational management of the VIS is ongoing with a view to providing the full EU-LISA command on VIS management in the second quarter of 2013. The technical activities supporting the operational management have been carried out smoothly; with in particular the signature of the Main-

tenance in Working Conditions contract with an IT consortium at the end of 2012.

Update on EU readmission agreements

Readmission agreement with Pakistan is in force since 1 December 2010. The level of implementation is quite weak. The first Joint Readmission Committee under the agreement was convened in June 2012. The next meeting should be held in February 2013.

The agreement with Turkey was initiated on 21 June 2012. The agreement is ready to be signed.

The agreement with Cape Verde was initiated on 24 April 2012. The agreement should be ready to be signed early 2013 once the Council grants its authorisation for the formal signature on behalf of the EU.

The negotiations on readmission agreement with Morocco are still stalled since 2010 and await the finalisation of the Mobility Partnership with Morocco. The negotiations with Belarus were not launched yet.

Readmission negotiations with Armenia have been completed (initialling of the Readmission Agreement took place on 18 October 2012) – now awaiting approval from the Council to sign the Agreement. Readmission negotiations with Azerbaijan are on the way – a fourth round is scheduled to take place in Brussels on 12 March 2013.


EUROSUR Directive – recent developments

Frontex has run the EUROSUR pilot project since 2010. All EUROSUR developments have been conducted in close collaboration with the European Commission and Member States. The EUROSUR Network has been in use since December 2011 and since March 2012 the Network has been used to exchange op-



erational information. During 2012 the Network was expanded from the original six Member States (Spain, France, Italy, Slovakia, Poland and Finland) to 18 (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Norway).

National Coordination Centres (NCCs) have been established in all these countries. The EUROSUR Directive is expected to enter into force as of 1st October 2013. By this date, the main pieces of the EUROSUR framework as well as the so called EUROSUR 'basic services' should be available.



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5. Outlook

Based on the descriptions of the situation in 2012 and a review of the main factors, be it economic, legal or technical, that can contribute one way or another to irregular migration to the EU, this chapter reviews the possible evolution of the situation along the external border of the EU in the short-term. However, past experiences demonstrate that there are a large number of unforeseeable events and factors that can have a profound and unpredictable impact on the situation at the border.

5.1. Croatia joining the EU in July 2013

Accession negotiations with Croatia were closed in June 2011. After the European Commission's favourable opinion, the European Parliament's assent and the Council decision on the admission of Croatia, the Accession Treaty was signed on 9 December 2011. Croatia has ratified the Accession Treaty and will become a Member of the EU on 1 July 2013, subject to the Accession Treaty being ratified by all Member States. As an acceding country, Croatia has an active observer status during the interim period before accession.

With Croatia joining the EU, the external land border of Member States of the EU will shift from the land border between Slovenia and Croatia (695 km) and Hungary and Croatia (355 km) to the land border between Croatia and Serbia (325 km), Croatia and Bosnia-Her-

zegovina (1 001 km) and Croatia and Montenegro (22 km), resulting in a net increase of 327 km. Combined, the borders between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro total approximately 1 377 km. Therefore, Croatia will be the Member State with the longest external land border, slightly longer than Finland (1 340 km) and Greece (1 248 km).

The border section between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1 001 km) will be the second longest land border section, after the land border between Finland and the Russian Federation (1 340 km). This long border section crosses very diverse terrain, from small mountain ranges to urban areas.

Among all Croatian land border sections, the border between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina will be one of the busiest EU land border sections in terms of regular traffic.

The main change in passenger flow across the external land borders of the EU will be the exclusion of the large flow of passengers across the Slovenian-Croatian border. This is currently the land border section with the heaviest passenger traffic through BCPs, with 25 million entries in 2012.

The fact that Croatia is not yet joining the Schengen area and that border control will continue to operate between Croatia and Slovenia, is expected to have moderate impact on the main routes used by irregular migrants.



5.2. Illegal border-crossing expected to remain concentrated at the southern and south-eastern borders of the EU

Based on the location of the main countries of origin for irregular migration to the EU for the past five years, the border areas that are most likely to deal with illegal border-crossing remain the Southern Mediterranean coast, and the borders with Turkey. Migrants living in or having relatively easy/facilitated access to Turkey and/or North Africa will continue to be overrepresented in the flow of irregular migrants to the EU.

The internet and social networking sites will contribute to the rapid exploitation of vulnerabilities along the external border of the EU, allowing relatively cheap and non-sophisticated illegal border-crossing. It is expected that illegal border-crossing along the green border, either at the land border or the sea border, will continue to significantly mobilise border-control authorities in the EU.

5.3. Increase in passenger flows, in particular at the air border

Regular passenger flows across the external border will increase significantly in the coming years due to rising global mobility, visa liberalisation processes and local border traffic agreements along the eastern borders. Consistent with the increasing flow of passengers, a growing number of registered traveller programmes (RTP)

should further ensure the smooth flow of bona fide passengers.

An important strategy for efficiently processing increasing passenger flows is the development and deployment of Automated Border Checks. Such systems are being installed progressively in several Member States' airports. Automated Border Checks uses the electronic information in the passport like facial or iris recognition technology to perform checks normally undertaken manually at the BCP.

5.4. Increase in mixed migratory flows: asylum seekers and irregular migrants

The EU continues to receive a high number of refugees and asylum seekers. On the other hand, still a substantial number of economic migrants appear to use the asylum procedure to try entering or staying on the territory of the EU.* The mixed nature of migratory flows contributes to placing the national asylum systems under pressure and the credibility of the asylum procedures under strain. Therefore, while Member States are continuing their asylum system reforms, they increasingly call for the development at EU level of migration and refugee solutions in the regions of origin and transit.

The proposal for the so-called visa safeguard clause (amending Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001), that was originally presented by the European Commission in May 2011 in response to growing abuse of asylum from the Western Balkans, is still not adopted.

* European Commission's Multi-Annual Thematic Programme, *Cooperation with Third Countries in the areas of Migration and Asylum*, 2011–2013



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6. Conclusions

The assessment of risks along the EU external borders shows that despite a sharp reduction in detections between 2011 and 2012, the risks associated with illegal border-crossing along the land and sea external borders remain among the highest, in particular in the southern part of the border of the EU. This is due to the current uncertainties related to the sustainability of the efforts at the Greek-Turkish land border, combined with a continued volatile situation in traditional departing countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Resurgence of situations at the southern border during which thousands of persons illegally cross the border in a few weeks or months remains likely. Past experiences also show that these crises take their toll on human lives, are very difficult to predict and to quell without coordinated responses.

Most risks associated with document fraud were assessed as high. Indeed, document fraudsters not only undermine border security but also the internal security of the EU. These risks are also common to nearly all Member States, as they are associated with passenger flow and border checks, a specific expertise of border-control authorities.

Most risks associated with abuse of legal channels are often assessed as high due to their high and widespread occurrence. Although no reliable measurements exist, they probably represent the easiest and most common *modus operandi* for persons staying illegally in the EU.

Clandestine entry, mostly people hiding in vehicles, is assessed as moderate. However, uncertainties remain on the extent of the phenomenon, as there is no reliable measurement in place.

Based on currently available information, the risks associated with cross-border criminality are assessed as moderate, including the risks of trafficking in human beings, terrorism, smuggling of illicit drugs and exit of stolen vehicles.

Border-control authorities may increase prevention by early detections only through strengthened border management resulting in increased coordination with other law-enforcement bodies.



7. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations: **n.a.** not applicable
: data not available

Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 12 February 2013, unless otherwise indicated

Note: 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 27 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries

Indicator 1A – Detections of illegal border-crossing between border-crossing points:

The number of third-country nationals detected by Member State authorities when illegally entering or attempting to enter the territory **between border-crossing points (BCPs)** at external borders only. Detections during hot pursuits at the immediate vicinity of the border are included. This indicator should not include EU or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs

Routes	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Eastern Mediterranean route (Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus)	55 688	57 025	37 224	51	-35
Land	49 513	55 558	32 854		-41
Afghanistan	21 389	19 308	7 973		-59
Syria	495	1 216	6 216		411
Bangladesh	1 496	3 541	4 598		30
Sea	6 175	1 467	4 370		198
Afghanistan	1 373	310	1 593		414
Syria	139	76	906		1 092
Palestine	1 500	128	408		219
Central Mediterranean route (Italy and Malta)	1 662	59 002	10 379	14	-82
Somalia	82	1 400	3 394		142
Tunisia	650	27 964	2 244		-92
Eritrea	55	641	1 889		195
Western Mediterranean route	5 003	8 448	6 397	8.8	-24
Sea	3 436	5 103	3 558		-30
Algeria	1 242	1 037	1 048		1.1
Morocco	300	775	364		-53
Chad	46	230	262		14
Land	1 567	3 345	2 839		-15
Not specified	1 108	2 610	1 410		-46
Algeria	459	735	967		32
Morocco	0	0	144		n.a.
Western Balkan route	2 371	4 658	6 391	8.8	37
Afghanistan	469	983	1 665		69
Kosovo*	372	498	942		89
Pakistan	39	604	861		43
Circular route from Albania to Greece	35 297	5 269	5 502	7.6	4.4
Albania	32 451	5 022	5 398		7.5
fyROM	49	23	36		57
Kosovo*	21	37	34		-8.1
Apulia and Calabria (Italy)	2 788	5 259	4 772	6.6	-9.3
Afghanistan	1 664	2 274	1 705		-25
Pakistan	53	992	1 156		17
Bangladesh	12	209	497		138
Eastern borders route	1 052	1 049	1 597	2.2	52
Georgia	144	209	328		57
Somalia	48	120	263		119
Afghanistan	132	105	200		90
Western African route	196	340	174	0.2	-49
Morocco	179	321	104		-68
Gambia	1	2	39		1 850
Senegal	2	4	15		275
Other	3	1	1	0	0
Iran	0	0	1		n.a.
Russian Federation	2	0	0		n.a.
Somalia	0	1	0		-100
Total	104 060	141 051	72 437		-49

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

Detections by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders

	2009	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
All Borders						
Afghanistan	14 539	25 918	22 994	13 169	18	-43
Syria	613	861	1 616	7 903	11	389
Albania	38 905	33 260	5 138	5 651	7.8	10
Algeria	4 487	8 763	6 157	5 479	7.6	-11
Bangladesh	551	1 647	4 923	5 417	7.5	10
Somalia	9 115	4 619	3 011	5 038	7.0	67
Pakistan	1 592	3 878	15 375	4 877	6.7	-68
Tunisia	1 701	1 498	28 829	2 717	3.8	-91
Eritrea	2 228	1 439	1 572	2 604	3.6	66
Morocco	1 710	1 959	3 780	2 122	2.9	-44
Others	29 158	20 218	47 656	17 460	24	-63
Total all borders	104 599	104 060	141 051	72 437		-49
Land Border						
Afghanistan	2 410	22 844	20 396	9 838	20	-52
Syria	389	530	1 254	6 416	13	412
Albania	38 088	32 592	5 076	5 460	11	7.6
Bangladesh	305	1 506	3 575	4 751	9.7	33
Algeria	676	6 961	4 671	4 081	8.3	-13
Pakistan	1 328	3 675	13 781	3 344	6.8	-76
Not specified	565	1 304	2 747	1 817	3.7	-34
Somalia	259	4 102	1 498	1 558	3.2	4.0
Morocco	737	1 319	2 236	1 422	2.9	-36
Palestine	2 791	2 661	652	1 195	2.4	83
Others	9 892	12 306	13 993	9 301	19	-34
Total land borders	57 440	89 800	69 879	49 183		-30
Sea Border						
Somalia	8 856	517	1 513	3 480	15	130
Afghanistan	12 129	3 074	2 598	3 331	14	28
Tunisia	1 643	711	28 013	2 283	9.8	-92
Eritrea	2 195	507	680	1 942	8.4	186
Pakistan	264	203	1 594	1 533	6.6	-3.8
Syria	224	331	362	1 487	6.4	311
Algeria	3 811	1 802	1 486	1 398	6.0	-5.9
Egypt	545	713	1 948	1 283	5.5	-34
Morocco	973	640	1 544	700	3.0	-55
Bangladesh	246	141	1 348	666	2.9	-51
Others	16 273	5 621	30 086	5 151	22	-83
Total sea borders	47 159	14 260	71 172	23 254	100	-67

Indicator 1B – Detections of illegal border-crossing at border-crossing points:

The number of third-country nationals detected by Member State authorities when entering clandestinely or attempting to enter illegally (such as hiding in transport means or in another physical way to avoid border checks at BCPs) the territory at **border-crossing points (BCPs)** at external borders only, whether they result in a refusal of entry or not. This indicator should not include EU or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

Clandestine entries at BCPs

Detections reported by Member State and top ten nationalities at the external borders

	2009	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Border Type						
Land	137	168	159	486	81	208
Sea	159	74	123	115	19	-6.5
Top Ten Nationalities						
Afghanistan	18	8	58	190	31	228
Algeria	30	35	55	61	10	11
Turkey	73	93	24	41	6.8	71
Syria	2	3	6	36	6.0	500
Albania	3	7	9	35	5.8	289
Morocco	20	14	15	24	4.0	60
Pakistan	2	12	10	24	4.0	140
Palestine	14	4	17	24	4.0	41
Serbia	4	2	4	23	3.8	475
Philippines	0	8	1	17	2.8	1600
Others	130	56	83	126	21	62
Total	296	242	282	601		115

**Indicator 2 – Detections of facilitators:**

The number of facilitators intercepted by Member State authorities who have intentionally assisted third-country nationals in the illegal entry to, or exit from, the territory across external borders. The indicator concerns detections of facilitators at the following locations: (1) at the external border (both at and between BCPs, for land air and sea) and (2) inside the territory and at internal borders between two Schengen Member States provided that the activities concerned the facilitation of third-country nationals for illegal entry or exit at external borders. This indicator should include third-country nationals as well as EU and/or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

Facilitators

Detections reported by Member State, place of detection and top ten nationalities*

	2009	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Border Type						
Inland	5 901	5 918	5 146	5 186	67	0.8
Land	1 160	1 171	625	887	11	42
Land Intra EU	618	616	365	498	6.5	36
Sea	997	503	324	471	6.1	45
Air	277	300	367	358	4.6	-2.5
Not specified	218	121	130	320	4.1	146
Top Ten Nationalities						
Italy	875	1 367	568	543	7.0	-4.4
Spain	286	285	320	498	6.5	56
Not specified	322	261	255	479	6.2	88
Morocco	475	413	390	461	6.0	18
Romania	292	398	268	364	4.7	36
France	230	365	404	352	4.6	-13
China	731	554	375	316	4.1	-16
Pakistan	245	245	237	286	3.7	21
Albania	670	430	221	243	3.1	10
Turkey	405	305	204	238	3.1	17
Others	4 640	4 006	3 715	3 940	51	6.1
Total	9 171	8 629	6 957	7 720		11

* Italy does not distinguish between facilitators of illegal border-crossing and facilitators of illegal stay.

Indicator 3 – Detections of illegal stay:

The number of third-country nationals detected by Member State authorities while not fulfilling, or no longer fulfilling, the conditions for stay or residence in the Member State during the reference month, irrespective of whether they were detected inland or while trying to exit the territory. The category should include third-country nationals who are not in the possession of a valid visa, residence permit, travel document, etc. or in breach of a decision to leave the country. It also includes third-country nationals who initially entered legally but then overstayed their permission to stay. This indicator should not include EU or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

Illegal stay

Detections reported by Member State, place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2009	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Place of Detection						
Inland	340 180	295 274	283 308	278 438	81	-1.7
Air	28 624	29 322	33 126	35 410	10	6.9
Land	6 351	7 011	17 640	19 883	5.8	13
Land Intra EU	17 594	12 996	9 230	5 832	1.7	-37
Sea	19 156	7 232	6 593	4 585	1.3	-30
Between BCPs	198	1 233	1 049	724	0.2	-31
Not specified	22	9	2	56		2 700
Top Ten Nationalities						
Afghanistan	38 637	21 104	25 296	24 395	7.1	-3.6
Morocco	25 816	22 183	21 887	21 268	6.2	-2.8
Pakistan	9 058	10 508	12 621	18 334	5.3	45
Algeria	12 286	14 261	15 398	15 776	4.6	2.5
Tunisia	10 569	8 350	22 864	15 211	4.4	-33
Albania	28 810	20 862	10 207	13 264	3.8	30
Ukraine	10 021	8 835	12 847	13 081	3.8	1.8
Syria	3 838	3 160	3 746	11 967	3.5	219
Serbia	7 028	12 477	10 397	11 503	3.3	11
Russian Federation	9 526	9 471	10 314	11 486	3.3	11
Others	256 536	221 866	205 371	188 643	55	-8.1
Total	412 125	353 077	350 948	344 928		-1.7

**Indicator 4 – Refusals of entry:**

The number of third-country nationals refused entry at the external border. The indicator concerns only those third-country nationals who were refused entry by Member State authorities according to Article 13 of the Schengen Borders Code (Regulation (EC) No 562/2006) for not fulfilling all the entry conditions laid down in Article 5(1) while not belonging to the categories of persons referred to in Article 5(4), and to whom a standard refusal form has been issued in accordance with Annex V of the Schengen Borders Code. This indicator should not include EU or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

Refusals of entry

Refusals reported by Member State, border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders

	2009	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Border Type						
Land	52 739	53 915	59 592	64 783	56	8.7
Air	55 606	49 363	49 419	44 063	38	-11
Sea	4 684	5 373	9 100	6 459	5.6	-29
Top Ten Nationalities						
Ukraine	18 964	18 744	15 810	18 103	16	15
Albania	1 672	2 324	15 947	12 036	10	-25
Russian Federation	7 608	9 171	9 221	9 754	8.5	5.8
Georgia	6 045	3 328	2 801	8 844	7.7	216
Serbia	3 544	6 543	6 672	5 639	4.9	-15
Belarus	4 965	5 662	5 983	5 033	4.4	-16
Morocco	3 300	2 349	4 168	3 934	3.4	-5.6
Croatia	4 944	4 305	3 756	3 849	3.3	2.5
Brazil	8 062	6 178	4 777	3 042	2.6	-36
Turkey	3 859	3 663	3 247	3 040	2.6	-6.4
Others	50 066	46 384	45 729	42 031	36	-8.1
Total	113 029	108 651	118 111	115 305		-2.4

Refusals of entry by nationality

Refusals by Member State, by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders

	2009	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
All Borders						
Ukraine	18 964	18 744	15 810	18 103	16	15
Albania	1 672	2 324	15 947	12 036	10	-25
Russian Federation	7 608	9 171	9 221	9 754	8.5	5.8
Georgia	6 045	3 328	2 801	8 844	7.7	216
Serbia	3 544	6 543	6 672	5 639	4.9	-15
Belarus	4 965	5 662	5 983	5 033	4.4	-16
Morocco	3 300	2 349	4 168	3 934	3.4	-5.6
Croatia	4 944	4 305	3 756	3 849	3.3	2.5
Brazil	8 062	6 178	4 777	3 042	2.6	-36
Turkey	3 859	3 663	3 247	3 040	2.6	-6.4
Others	50 066	46 384	45 729	42 031	36	-8.1
Total all borders	113 029	108 651	118 111	115 305		-2.4
Land Border						
Ukraine	17 963	17 658	14 697	17 007	26	16
Georgia	5 841	3 098	2 571	8 535	13	232
Albania	771	1 263	8 978	7 378	11	-18
Russian Federation	6 048	6 389	5 913	7 306	11	24
Belarus	4 828	5 555	5 840	4 912	7.6	-16
Serbia	3 189	5 518	5 550	4 810	7.4	-13
Croatia	4 684	4 067	3 528	3 634	5.6	3.0
Morocco	1 046	940	2 827	2 416	3.7	-15
ŸROM	1 926	3 307	2 648	1 781	2.7	-33
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 190	799	1 519	1 532	2.4	0.9
Others	5 253	5 321	5 521	5 472	8.4	-0.9
Total land borders	52 739	53 915	59 592	64 783		8.7
Air Border						
Brazil	7 956	6 072	4 697	2 980	6.8	-37
Albania	524	624	3 303	2 689	6.1	-19
United States	2 834	2 338	2 219	1 966	4.5	-11
Not specified	1 866	1 434	1 530	1 958	4.4	28
Nigeria	2 141	1 719	1 544	1 709	3.9	11
Russian Federation	1 310	1 369	1 459	1 650	3.7	13
Turkey	1 695	1 606	1 303	1 422	3.2	9.1
Algeria	813	685	1 191	1 330	3.0	12
China	2 741	1 613	1 124	1 195	2.7	6.3
Morocco	1 005	1 080	1 007	997	2.3	-1.0
Others	32 721	30 823	30 042	26 167	59	-13
Total air borders	55 606	49 363	49 419	44 063		-11
Sea Border						
Albania	377	437	3 666	1 969	30	-46
Russian Federation	250	1 413	1 849	798	12	-57
Philippines	403	589	739	749	12	1.4
Morocco	1 249	329	334	521	8.1	56
Not specified	131	82	150	251	3.9	67
India	223	227	135	187	2.9	39
Kiribati	4	0	7	144	2.2	1 957
Turkey	279	303	165	139	2.2	-16
Serbia	53	92	170	133	2.1	-22
Ukraine	144	194	155	131	2.0	-15
Others	1 571	1 707	1 730	1 437	22	-17
Total sea borders	4 684	5 373	9 100	6 459		-29



Reasons for refusals of entry

Reasons for refusals of entry reported by Member State at the external borders

	Refused persons Total	Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
Top Ten Nationalities												
Ukraine	18 103	55	195	5 040	194	8 950	875	1 759	807	89	183	18 147
Albania	12 036	261	1 083	239	113	1 867	360	2 920	6 030	306	485	13 664
Russian Federation	9 754	541	17	6 459	186	1 083	85	700	498	385	138	10 092
Georgia	8 844	8	26	7 440	10	176	38	32	1 169	3	12	8 914
Serbia	5 639	181	32	644	13	370	1 365	965	2 056	117	26	5 769
Belarus	5 033	38	2	2 517	2	804	46	1 231	307	116	26	5 089
Morocco	3 934	1 764	170	466	95	615	24	129	886	177	28	4 354
Croatia	3 849	1 072	8	218	1	150	954	226	763	905	108	4 405
Brazil	3 042	10	35	338	15	919	117	263	359	38	1 105	3 199
Turkey	3 040	192	101	1 776	61	511	53	139	179	56	103	3 171
Others	42 031	3 416	2 095	10 314	1 147	9 861	1 447	2 651	2 637	1 078	8 913	43 559
Total	115 305	7 538	3 764	35 451	1 837	25 306	5 364	11 015	15 691	3 270	11 127	120 363

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

- A** has no valid travel document(s);
- B** has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- C** has no valid visa or residence permit;
- D** has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- E** has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- F** has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
- G** does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- H** is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- I** is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union;

Reasons for refusals of entry

Reasons for refusals of entry reported by Member State at the external borders

	2009	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year	Highest share
All Borders							
							Nationality
C) No valid visa	36 447	31 241	29 866	35 451	29	19	Georgia (21%)
E) No justification	29 736	25 987	25 933	25 306	21	-2.4	Ukraine (35%)
H) Alert issued	7 556	12 627	20 243	15 691	13	-22	Albania (38%)
Reason not available	17 862	14 798	12 861	11 127	9.2	-13	United States (15%)
G) No subsistence	7 105	8 576	11 624	11 015	9.2	-5.2	Albania (27%)
A) No valid document	5 960	4 767	7 810	7 538	6.3	-3.5	Morocco (23%)
F) Over 3 month stay	2 010	5 589	5 482	5 364	4.5	-2.2	Serbia (25%)
B) False document	3 099	2 908	2 799	3 764	3.1	34	Albania (29%)
I) Threat	2 329	2 561	2 835	3 270	2.7	15	Croatia (28%)
D) False visa	1 599	1 715	1 818	1 837	1.5	1.0	Ukraine (11%)
Total all borders	113 703	110 769	121 271	120 363		-0.7	
Land Border							
							Nationality
C) No valid visa	24 990	19 668	18 495	25 054	37	35	Georgia (29%)
E) No justification	12 240	11 523	9 429	11 849	17	26	Ukraine (72%)
H) Alert issued	5 167	8 901	13 767	11 258	17	-18	Albania (35%)
G) No subsistence	5 121	5 298	7 695	7 486	11	-2.7	Albania (32%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 149	4 633	4 577	4 518	6.7	-1.3	Serbia (29%)
A) No valid document	1 962	1 747	3 514	3 498	5.2	-0.5	Morocco (48%)
I) Threat	1 625	1 752	2 095	2 073	3.1	-1.1	Croatia (43%)
B) False document	170	420	382	1 407	2.1	268	Albania (75%)
D) False visa	326	410	505	640	0.9	27	Ukraine (30%)
Reason not available	54	3	1	0	0	-100	Moldova
Total land borders	52 804	54 355	60 460	67 783		12	
Air Border							
							Nationality
E) No justification	17 230	14 352	15 880	12 807	28	-19	Albania (7.9%)
Reason not available	17 050	14 127	12 362	10 713	23	-13	United States (15%)
C) No valid visa	10 268	8 854	9 184	8 651	19	-5.8	Russian Fed. (9.6%)
G) No subsistence	1 933	3 190	3 482	3 297	7.2	-5.3	Albania (9.3%)
H) Alert issued	2 002	2 973	3 354	2 697	5.9	-20	Albania (29%)
A) No valid document	2 292	2 175	2 324	2 612	5.7	12	Unknown (38%)
B) False document	2 754	2 373	2 311	2 239	4.9	-3.1	Unknown (18%)
D) False visa	1 211	1 266	1 190	1 126	2.4	-5.4	Nigeria (8.4%)
I) Threat	649	790	709	1 121	2.4	58	Suriname (13%)
F) Over 3 month stay	828	917	879	834	1.8	-5.1	United States (13%)
Total air borders	56 217	51 017	51 675	46 097		-11	
Sea Border							
							Nationality
C) No valid visa	1 189	2 719	2 187	1 746	27	-20	Philippines (35%)
H) Alert issued	387	753	3 122	1 736	27	-44	Albania (75%)
A) No valid document	1 706	845	1 972	1 428	22	-28	Russian Fed. (32%)
E) No justification	266	112	624	650	10	4.2	Albania (52%)
Reason not available	758	668	498	414	6.4	-17	Albania (14%)
G) No subsistence	51	88	447	232	3.6	-48	Albania (78%)
B) False document	175	115	106	118	1.8	11	Unknown (42%)
I) Threat	55	19	31	76	1.2	145	Albania (78%)
D) False visa	62	39	123	71	1.1	-42	Morocco (54%)
F) Over 3 month stay	33	39	26	12	0.2	-54	Turkey (50%)
Total sea borders	4 682	5 397	9 136	6 483		-29	

**Indicator 5 – Applications for international protection (asylum applications):**

The number of third-country nationals having submitted an application for international protection or having been included in such an application (e.g. as a family member) during the reference month (see Article 4.1 of Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of 11 July 2007). Each applicant for international protection must be recorded only once within the same reference month. This indicator concerns applications submitted to Member State authorities at the external border as well as applications submitted inside the territory. It is the number of new applications which have been submitted exclusively during the reporting month (in contrast to the total number of applications under consideration in a country at a certain time). It should include all applications for international protection such as for refugee status, subsidiary or temporary protection, etc. This indicator should not include EU or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

Applications for asylum

Applications for international protection reported by Member State and top ten nationalities

	2009	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Top Ten Nationalities						
Afghanistan	24 699	21 552	29 672	27 630	10	-6.9
Syria	4 421	4 488	8 180	22 424	8.2	174
Russian Federation	15 063	13 059	12 936	16 350	6.0	26
Serbia	4 819	15 460	12 416	15 940	5.9	28
Pakistan	8 358	7 129	12 335	15 417	5.7	25
Not specified	8 906	6 906	8 962	14 321	5.3	60
Somalia	19 529	15 348	13 266	14 279	5.2	7.6
Iran	7 950	9 691	11 263	12 085	4.4	7.3
Iraq	17 601	15 037	14 799	10 872	4.0	-27
Eritrea	7 910	6 897	9 193	10 264	3.8	12
Others	100 558	88 313	121 032	112 626	41	-6.9
Total	219 814	203 880	254 054	272 208		7.1

Indicator 6 – Persons using false travel documents for entering the territory illegally:

The number of persons who were detected by Member State authorities during border checks at BCPs who attempted to use false travel documents, false visas or false permissions to stay for the purpose of entering the territory. All cases of falsifications (forged, counterfeit, substitution of photo or name, fantasy documents, etc.) have to be included. The category concerns only those persons who used false passports, identity cards, residence or work permits, visas, etc., i.e. types of documents of which genuine versions would be valid for entering. Cases in which other types of documents have been used, such as false driving licences, false boarding passes or false supporting documents should not be included in this category. This indicator should include third-country nationals as well as EU and Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

Persons using fraudulent documents

Detections on entry from third countries to EU or Schengen area by Member State, border type or nationality

	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Border Type				
Air	3 651	4 411	56	21
Land	1 281	3 072	39	140
Sea	356	405	5.1	14
Top Ten nationalities				
Albania	155	2 110	27	1 261
Syria	83	486	6.2	486
Morocco	496	397	5.0	-20
Ukraine	437	284	3.6	-35
Nigeria	244	276	3.5	13
Pakistan	134	262	3.3	96
Iran	199	243	3.1	22
Afghanistan	90	202	2.6	124
Turkey	228	199	2.5	-13
Unknown	370	189	2.4	-49
Others	2 852	3 240	41	14
Total	5 288	7 888		49

Fraudulent documents

Detections of fraudulent documents on entry from third countries to EU or Schengen area by country of issuance and type of documents

	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year	Highest share
Country of issuance					
Greece	276	2 135	23	674	Stamps (78%)
Italy	812	986	11	21	Residence permits (28%)
France	586	689	7.5	18	Passports (35%)
Spain	614	487	5.3	-21	Residence permits (35%)
Germany	352	434	4.7	23	Residence permits (35%)
Albania	54	362	3.9	570	Stamps (94%)
Belgium	307	249	2.7	-19	Residence permits (45%)
Turkey	203	247	2.7	22	Passports (63%)
Poland	462	233	2.5	-50	Stamps (84%)
United Kingdom	143	231	2.5	62	Passports (88%)
Others	3 175	3 144	34	-1.0	Passports (68%)
Type of document					
Passports	2 742	3 177	35	16	Forged (42%)
Stamps	927	2 675	29	189	Counterfeit (93%)
Residence Permits	1 234	1 372	15	11	Counterfeit (46%)
ID Cards	994	944	10	-5.0	Counterfeit (51%)
Visa	736	762	8.3	3.5	Counterfeit (53%)
Other	351	267	2.9	-24	Counterfeit (68%)
Total	6 984	9 197		32	

**Indicator 7A – Administrative or judicial return decisions issued:**

The number of third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the territory of the Member State (as well as the EU and the Schengen Member States Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) as a result of an administrative or judicial decision or act stating or declaring that the stay of the third-country national was illegal according to the provisions of the EC Return Directive (Directive 2008/115/EC) or – if applicable – a return decision/order issued in accordance with national law. This indicator should not include EU or Schengen Associated Country (SAC) nationals.

Return decisions issued

Decisions issued by Member State and top ten nationalities

	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Top Ten Nationalities				
Pakistan	26 604	24 707	9.2	-7.1
Afghanistan	27 274	23 147	8.6	-15
Morocco	11 184	15 436	5.7	38
Albania	8 210	15 356	5.7	87
Bangladesh	7 895	13 987	5.2	77
Algeria	12 336	13 771	5.1	12
India	8 817	10 628	3.9	21
Tunisia	5 160	10 410	3.9	102
Nigeria	7 357	9 345	3.5	27
Ukraine	8 453	9 255	3.4	9.5
Others	108 095	123 907	46	15
Total	231 385	269 949		17

Indicator 7B – Third-country nationals effectively returned to third countries:

The number of third-country nationals returned from the territory of a Member State to a third country during the reporting month, either through voluntary departure or by forced return (removal). All cases included in this number have to be 1) either the consequence of an administrative or judicial decision or act stating or declaring that the stay of the third-country national was illegal and subject to an obligation to leave the territory of the Member State or 2) if a Member State makes use of the derogation provided for by Article 2(2) (b) of the Return Directive (e.g. the consequence of a return decision/order issued in accordance with national law). This indicator should not include EU nationals or third-country nationals returned to a Member State or a Schengen Associated Country (SAC).

Effective returns

People effectively returned to third countries by Member State and top ten nationalities

	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Top Ten Nationalities				
Albania	12 699	13 168	8.3	3.7
Pakistan	6 253	10 492	6.6	68
India	7 667	8 927	5.6	16
Morocco	6 905	7 697	4.8	11
Ukraine	6 500	7 630	4.8	17
Serbia	4 948	7 494	4.7	51
Russian Federation	6 221	6 869	4.3	10
Tunisia	8 623	6 402	4.0	-26
China	5 145	5 256	3.3	2.2
Brazil	6 064	4 921	3.1	-19
Others	78 020	80 634	51	3.4
Total	149 045	159 490		7.0



Effective returns by type of return

People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

	2009	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
TYPE OF RETURN*						
Forced	:	:	80 809	82 630	52	2.3
Enforced by Member State	26 233	23 091	69 982	70 781	86	1.1
Not specified	3 307	10 213	9 527	10 115	12	6.2
Enforced by Joint Operation	3 307	10 213	1 300	1 734	2.1	33
Voluntary	:	:	57 170	65 562	41	15
Others	21 234	22 426	32 140	36 394	56	13
IOM-assisted	6 769	6 408	13 908	15 422	24	11
Not specified	5 163	9 882	11 122	13 746	21	24
Not specified	:	:	11 066	11 298	7.1	2.1
Total	:	:	149 045	159 490		7.0
TOP TEN NATIONALITIES						
Forced						
Albania	:	:	12 232	11 963	14	-2.2
Pakistan	:	:	3 938	7 192	8.7	83
Tunisia	:	:	7 279	5 224	6.3	-28
India	:	:	2 866	3 421	4.1	19
Afghanistan	:	:	3 180	3 393	4.1	6.7
Morocco	:	:	2 852	3 312	4.0	16
Bangladesh	:	:	1 781	3 180	3.8	79
Serbia	:	:	2 668	2 930	3.5	9.8
Nigeria	:	:	3 112	2 725	3.3	-12
Algeria	:	:	2 072	2 535	3.1	22
Others	:	:	38 829	36 755	44	-5.3
Total Forced Returns	:	:	80 809	82 630		2.3
Voluntary						
Ukraine	:	:	4 716	6 068	9.3	29
Russian Federation	:	:	4 944	5 515	8.4	12
India	:	:	4 763	5 449	8.3	14
Serbia	:	:	2 265	4 539	6.9	100
Pakistan	:	:	2 230	3 066	4.7	37
China	:	:	2 850	2 701	4.1	-5.2
Brazil	:	:	3 177	2 697	4.1	-15
FRYROM	:	:	1 742	2 145	3.3	23
Iraq	:	:	2 206	2 069	3.2	-6.2
Nigeria	:	:	1 956	1 639	2.5	-16
Others	:	:	26 321	29 674	45	13
Total Voluntary Returns	:	:	57 170	65 562		15

* The figures for type of return for 2009 and 2010 only include countries reporting historical data.

Notes on FRAN data sources and methods

The term Member States refers to FRAN Member States, which includes the 27 Member States and the three Schengen Associated Countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). For the data concerning detections at the external borders of the EU, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area where the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain, and in Greece these detections are included in the data for indicator 1A. Data for Norway only include detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border-crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehen-

sions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land Intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections on exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK. For Greece, only detections of illegal stayers with false documents are reported at the air border as detections of illegal stay on exit.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For Switzerland, requests for asylum at the Swiss embassies abroad are also reported and considered as inland applications in the FRAN data. For the UK, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.

For Ireland, data on persons using false documents are only available from February 2011 (FRAN Indicator 6). In Sweden, the data on false document use are not presented since the reported detections do not distinguish between apprehensions of persons using false documents at the external border and those apprehended inland.





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